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There is something missing in interpretive theory. Recent controversies—involving, 
for example, the first travel ban and funding for sanctuary cities—demonstrate that 
presidential “laws” (executive orders, proclamations, and other directives) raise 
important questions of meaning. Yet, while there is a rich literature on statutory 
interpretation and a growing one on regulatory interpretation, there is no theory 
about how to discern the meaning of presidential directives. Courts, for their part, 
have repeatedly assumed that presidential directives should be treated just like 
statutes. But that does not seem right: theories of interpretation depend on both 
constitutional law and institutional setting. For statutes, the relevant law comes from 
Article I and the procedures governing Congress. For presidential directives, the 
starting point must be Article II. This Article contends that Article II and the distinct 
institutional setting of the presidency point toward textualism. Article II, particularly 
the Opinions Clause, gives the President considerable power to structure the process 
by which he issues directives. Drawing on various sources—including the author’s 
interviews with officials from the Trump, Obama, and other administrations—this 
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Article offers a window into that process. Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have 
invited agency officials to draft, negotiate over, and redraft presidential directives. 
The final directive signed by the President may not reflect his preferred substantive 
policy; instead, Presidents often issue compromise directives that reflect their 
subordinates’ recommendations. This Article argues that courts respect that structure, 
and hold Presidents accountable for any mistakes, by adhering closely to the text. 
Thus, whatever one thinks about honoring the textual compromises that come from 
Congress, there are independent and important reasons to hew strictly to the text that 
comes from the White House. Notably, this analysis has important implications not 
only for interpretive theory but also for broader questions about the constitutional 
separation of powers. In an era of ever-expanding presidential power, Presidents have 
at times (surprisingly) allowed themselves to be constrained by their own 
administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is something missing in interpretive theory. Scholars have offered 
a rich literature on statutory interpretation and a growing one on regulatory 
interpretation. But what about the “laws” issued by the President himself—
that is, the assortment of executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, and 
other directives? To be sure, commentators recognize that courts may 
examine the validity of such directives—that is, whether the President 
exceeded either statutory or constitutional authority.1 But recent 
controversies—involving the first travel ban and funding for sanctuary 
cities—demonstrate that presidential directives raise not only questions of 
validity but also questions of meaning.2 Yet Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner’s treatise Reading Law—which purports to address “all types of legal 
instruments” and discusses cases involving the U.S. Constitution, federal 
statutes, state statutes, and private contracts—does not so much as mention 
presidential directives.3 And although some commentary has recognized that 
courts must interpret such documents, none has offered a comprehensive 
interpretive theory.4 
 
1 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583-89 (1952) (concluding 
that the President exceeded his constitutional authority in issuing an executive order directing the 
seizure of property). Scholarship has explored the question of statutory authorization for 
presidential directives. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 545 (2005) 
(contending that directives “must be traceable to some identifiable” statute); see also Tara L. Branum, 
President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2, 64, 
68 (2002) (asserting that courts often liberally “justify the exercise of presidential power”); Joel L. 
Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1, 5-6, 19-25 (arguing that some executive orders rest on 
doubtful claims of broad statutory or constitutional authority). For a recent analysis of how a litigant 
might challenge a presidential directive as violating the Constitution or a federal statute, see Lisa 
Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI L. REV. 1743, 1800-23 (2019). 
2 See infra Section III.B. 
3 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012). 
4 See John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX. 
L. REV. 837, 847-78 (1981) (surveying cases in which executive orders have given rise to private rights 
of action); Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1337, 1345-92 
(2019) (surveying the use of “intent” in constitutional law and other areas and suggesting that while 
presidential intent may be relevant to constitutional law and statutory interpretation, on functional 
grounds, courts should be wary of relying on intent to interpret presidential directives); Erica 
Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2034-37 (2015) (offering an empirical 
survey of cases in the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court and finding that these courts have failed to 
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The federal judiciary, for its part, has regularly grappled with the meaning 
of presidential directives for well over a century. Courts have employed a 
variety of interpretive methods. But significantly, these (otherwise disparate) 
decisions have repeatedly reaffirmed a common assumption: presidential 
directives should be treated just like statutes.5 
This Article challenges that assumption. The argument builds on two 
(related) premises. First, as many scholars have recognized, much of 
interpretive theory is, at bottom, a theory of constitutional law.6 The law that 
governs statutory interpretation necessarily derives from the constitutional 
provisions that empower and constrain Congress—principally, Article I. 
Accordingly, in the statutory interpretation literature, scholars debate the 
implications of the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, 
Section 7, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause of Article I, Section 5.7 By 
contrast, any theory of interpreting presidential directives must build on the 
law that governs the President—primarily, Article II. 
Second, interpretive theory must also pay close attention to institutional 
setting. Congress is governed not only by the rules laid out in the 
Constitution but also by the internal rules and procedures that the House of 
 
develop a consistent framework for reviewing executive orders); see also Matthew Chou, Agency 
Interpretations of Executive Orders, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (2019) (exploring when courts 
should defer to agency interpretations of executive orders); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential 
Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1739 n.42 (2018) (“Legal scholars have, for the most part, not focused on 
presidential direct actions.”). 
5 See infra Part I; see also, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (“We approach the 
construction of [an executive order] as we would approach the construction of legislation in this 
field.”); De Kay v. United States, 280 F. 465, 472 (1st Cir. 1922) (“In construing the proclamation of 
the President the same rule of construction must be applied as in the construction of statutes . . . .”); 
United States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F.Supp.2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Court interprets 
Executive Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes.”). 
6 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
685, 686 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of “structural constitutional analysis” to “the basic 
interpretive commitments of formalism and antiformalism”); Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican 
Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a 
theory about constitutional law.”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory 
Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1122 
(2011) (contending that theories of statutory interpretation are undergirded by normative theories 
about the separation of powers); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of 
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1995) (describing the 
connection between statutory interpretation and democratic theory as “verg[ing] on the canonical”). 
The focus on constitutional theory is, of course, not universal. See infra note 65; see also William 
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1084, 1097-99 (2017) 
(arguing that rules of law governing courts’ interpretation of legal instruments are largely unwritten 
and found neither “in quasi-constitutional doctrines, [nor] the Constitution’s text”). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the roles of Congress and the President in federal 
lawmaking); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings	. . . .”); see also infra Section I.C. 
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Representatives and the Senate have crafted (pursuant to their Article I, 
Section 5 authority). Thus, statutory scholars debate whether, and the extent 
to which, courts should credit lawmakers’ heavy reliance on legislative 
history.8 This debate suggests that the interpretation of presidential directives 
should also be attentive to the institutional setting and procedures of the 
executive branch. Notably, the process through which presidential directives 
are issued is not set forth in the Constitution or any federal statute, nor is it 
widely known in the legal literature. Accordingly, this Article offers readers 
a window into that process—drawing on both political science research and 
the author’s own interviews with key players from the Trump, Obama, 
George W. Bush, and other past administrations.9 
This Article argues that Article II and the distinct institutional setting 
of the presidency point toward textualism. To be sure, one might assume 
that because the President is a unitary actor, courts should look to 
presidential intent. But such an approach would disregard the complex 
process that Presidents have created pursuant to their Article II authority 
for presidential lawmaking. Article II, particularly the Opinions Clause, 
grants the President considerable discretion to structure the process for 
issuing directives.10 Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have used that power 
to invite agency officials to draft, negotiate over, and redraft directives. 
Notably, the resulting text signed by the President may not reflect his 
preferred substantive policy. After the interagency consultation process, 
Presidents often opt to “split[] the difference” among agencies.11 
 
8 See infra footnotes 74–82 and accompanying text. 
9 Naturally, none of the individuals interviewed necessarily accept this Article’s assertions. See, 
e.g., Telephone Interview with John Bies, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Obama Admin. (May 2, 2018) [hereinafter Bies Interview]; Telephone Interview with Paul Clement, 
Solicitor Gen., George W. Bush Admin. (May 3, 2018) [hereinafter Clement Interview]; Telephone 
Interview with Rajesh De, Staff Sec’y, Obama Admin. (May 16, 2018) [hereinafter De Interview]; 
Telephone Interview with Brian Egan, Legal Advisor at Dep’t of State, Deputy White House 
Counsel for Nat’l Sec., and Assistant Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Treasury, Obama Admin. (May 24, 
2018) [hereinafter Egan Interview]; Telephone Interview with Chris Fonzone, Deputy Assistant and 
Deputy Counsel to President and Legal Advisor to Nat’l Sec. Council, Obama Admin. (May 22, 
2018) [hereinafter Fonzone Interview]; Telephone Interview with C. Boyden Gray, White House 
Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin., and Counsel to Vice President George H.W. Bush, Reagan 
Admin. (June 27, 2018) [hereinafter Gray Interview]; Telephone Interview with Michael Luttig, 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin. (July 16, 2018) 
[hereinafter Luttig Interview]; Interview with Don McGahn, White House Counsel, Trump 
Admin., in Williamsburg, Va. (March 23, 2018 & Nov. 19, 2018) [hereinafter McGahn Interview]; 
Interview with Lee Liberman Otis, Assoc. White House Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin., in 
Washington, D.C. (June 6, 2018) [hereinafter Otis Interview]. 
10 See infra Section II.A. 
11 KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 61-64 (2001); see also infra Section II.B. 
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Alternatively, after a more truncated process, the President may issue a 
directive that turns out (in hindsight) to have been ill-considered. Article II 
gives the President the power to make—and holds him accountable for—an 
informed or ill-informed decision. I argue that courts can best give effect to 
the structure the President has created—with its potential for compromise 
and less-than-effective policy—by adhering to the text. 
This analysis has important implications for both legal scholarship and 
recent litigation. First, this Article offers something that has been missing in 
interpretive theory: an approach for presidential instruments. The Article 
contends that courts should hew closely to the text of a directive, even when 
the text may not fit what the court believes to have been the President’s 
primary goal. Second, this Article shows that after agency review, a President 
may well issue a compromise or even toothless directive. This issue is of great 
importance in recent litigation over funding for sanctuary cities; President 
Trump’s directive seems to be so watered down as to be legally ineffective at 
defunding those jurisdictions.12 This textualist approach also offers a 
theoretical justification for why—despite the federal government’s assertions 
in defending the first travel ban—courts should not credit a memo from a 
White House official “clarifying” a presidential directive after the fact.13 
Article II concentrates accountability in the President himself. 
Even for those who are not convinced by the textualist method advocated 
here, this Article should at a minimum provide a roadmap for future work on 
interpreting presidential directives. Although scholars strongly dispute the 
proper approach to statutory interpretation, most do seem to agree that 
interpretive theory must be guided by what this Article has called 
constitutional and institutional concerns. As this Article asserts, for 
presidential directives, the starting point must be Article II, not Article I. 
Moreover, this Article’s emphasis on institutional setting links up with what 
might be called the emerging field of nonstatutory interpretation—recent 
 
12 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
13 See infra subsection III.B.1. 
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work on interpreting regulations,14 popular initiatives,15 and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.16 
Finally, this Article has implications for broader theories of constitutional 
law and presidential power. The Article shows that for nearly a century, 
Presidents have (surprisingly) sought out advice from, and often agreed to the 
recommendations of, their subordinates, even when issuing seemingly 
unilateral directives. That is, presidential directives are less “unilateral” than 
one might have thought. The Article thus contributes to the literature on the 
“internal separation of powers” within the executive branch—the idea that 
the bureaucracy itself may serve (at times) to constrain presidential power.17 
At the outset, I offer a few points of clarification. First, “textualism” is not 
self-defining.18 This Article uses the term to mean that judges must abide by 
the ordinary meaning of the text of a directive, understood in context. The 
relevant context encompasses, at a minimum, the text and structure of the 
directive at issue, other directives issued by the same administration (and 
likely those from past administrations), as well as linguistic conventions from 
legal terms of art, dictionaries, and colloquial speech.19 
Second, this Article does not aim to resolve questions about specific 
canons of interpretation. It is arguable that some statutory canons may not 
properly carry over to the context of presidential directives, or that this 
 
14 See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 260-61 (2000) (prioritizing “pre-promulgation materials” over an agency’s 
“post-promulgation views” in deciphering the intent behind a regulation); Jennifer Nou, Regulatory 
Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 84 (2015) (theorizing that regulatory interpretation should “focus[] on 
the public meaning of the rule’s legally binding text”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 355, 360-62 (2012) (advocating a “purposive” method because regulations require 
“statement[s] of basis and purpose”). 
15 See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 
105 YALE L.J. 107, 111 (1995) (critiquing judicial attempts to determine the “popular intent” behind 
statutes passed through voter initiatives). 
16 See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 2167, 2168 (2017) (advocating interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through an 
administrative law framework). 
17 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006); see also infra Part IV. 
18 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005). 
19 Notably, this Article addresses judicial interpretation of presidential directives. Accordingly, 
the Article focuses on the subset of presidential directives that reach the courts. Many directives do 
not go to court—perhaps because they address national security matters (and are therefore classified) 
or they do not affect private parties in a way that creates an Article III case or controversy. Such 
directives will likely be interpreted solely by executive officials. Much of this Article’s analysis should 
inform the way in which executive officials perform that interpretive task. But nonjudicial 
interpretation of presidential directives may also raise distinct issues. For now, I bracket the issue of 
nonjudicial interpretation and hope to address it in future work. 
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arena calls for adjustments or even different canons.20 Although this Article 
does not address those issues, the framework offered here—a focus on 
Article II and the institutional setting of the executive branch—should 
inform future work. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I lays important groundwork, 
describing presidential directives and the tendency of courts to treat 
directives as statutes. The Part argues that courts have largely overlooked the 
very different institutional contexts of Congress and the presidency. Parts II 
and III offer an Article II-based theory of interpreting presidential directives, 
arguing that the constitutional structure and the distinct institutional setting 
of the executive branch point toward textualism. Finally, Part IV suggests 
that the process for issuing presidential directives points toward some 
(perhaps unexpected) constraints on presidential power. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN COURT: A LACK OF THEORY 
Presidential directives have received surprisingly little attention in the 
legal academic literature. Accordingly, to frame the discussion, this Part 
provides some needed background. The Part then moves to the central point: 
federal courts have repeatedly assumed—without analysis—that presidential 
directives should be interpreted like statutes. This Article contends, however, 
that a theory for presidential directives must rest on Article II, not Article I. 
A. Definition and Brief Historical Background 
Presidents today issue a variety of directives—labeled as “executive 
orders,” “proclamations,” “memoranda,” or simply “directives.”21 Although 
some early commentary sought to make sharp distinctions among these 
documents,22 more recent commentators have recognized that Presidents 
 
20 For example, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner argued that the “venerable principle that an 
ambiguity should be resolved against the party responsible for drafting the document . . . does not 
apply to governmental directives.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 42. That may be sensible for 
statutes, but less so for presidential directives—at least when they impact government contractors 
or employees. See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 556 (1956) (suggesting “[a]ny ambiguities” in an 
executive order that required the termination of disloyal employees “should . . . be resolved against 
the Government”). 
21 PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 16, 172-75, 208-09 (2d ed. 2014); see Stack, supra note 1, at 546-47 
(noting that “American law provides no definition of executive orders” and that there are no “legal 
requirements on the types of directives that the president must issue as an executive order”). 
22 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957) 
(suggesting executive orders are “directed to” executive officials, while proclamations are aimed at 
private conduct). 
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often use these devices interchangeably.23 President Trump’s recent directives 
illustrate this point. The first two versions of the travel ban were “executive 
orders,”24 while the third was a “proclamation.”25 
As discussed below (in Part II), the label does affect, to some degree, the 
procedure through which the directive is created or revised.26 But a President 
may seek to fulfill the same policy through an executive order, proclamation, 
memorandum, or other device. Accordingly, at the outset, this Article defines 
a presidential directive broadly as any directive that requires, authorizes, or 
prohibits some action by executive officials.27 
Notably, these directives have a lengthy historical pedigree. Presidents 
have issued pronouncements to their subordinates since the days of George 
Washington.28 But while those early directives did at times wind up in court, 
most nineteenth-century litigation dealt with the validity of the presidential 
directive at issue (that is, whether it was consistent with the Constitution or 
a federal statute).29 Questions of meaning were, at best, in the background. 
My research suggests that the federal judiciary dealt more regularly with 
cases involving the meaning of presidential directives beginning in the early 
twentieth century.30 That is likely because the number of directives 
 
23 See, e.g., GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL 
DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 7 (2013) (describing how government officials treat executive 
orders and proclamations “as being very similar, if not interchangeable”); see also Legal Effectiveness 
of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order, 24 Op. O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000) 
[hereinafter O.L.C., Legal Effectiveness] (“[T]here is no substantive difference in the legal 
effectiveness of an executive order and [other] presidential directive[s.]”). 
24 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban Version 
One] (titled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”); Exec. 
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban Version Two] (same). 
25 See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban 
Version Three] (titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”). 
26 The Office of Management and Budget oversees the creation of an executive order or 
proclamation, while other White House sections handle other types of directives. See infra 
Section II.B. 
27 Accord MAYER, supra note 11, at 4 (“Executive orders are . . . presidential directives that 
require or authorize some action within the executive branch . . . .”); DODDS, supra note 23, at 10. 
28 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 90-119 (providing a historical survey of early presidential 
directives, including Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of April 1793 and Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation). 
29 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (concluding that President 
John Adams exceeded his statutory authority by ordering the seizure of vessels); see also DODDS, 
supra note 23, at 54-85 (discussing nineteenth-century judicial decisions, which focused on the 
validity of the directive at issue); infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing my research). 
30 With the help of research assistants, I conducted Westlaw searches and looked at hundreds 
of cases. It was clear that the bulk of disputes over meaning arose beginning in the early twentieth 
century. The search terms included: adv: TE(“executive order” /s interp! or constru! or mean!); adv: 
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skyrocketed around that time, starting with the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt.31 As political scientists have reported, Roosevelt issued almost as 
many directives as all of his predecessors combined.32 The rise in litigation 
may also reflect the increasing significance of these directives.33 Presidents 
began to make policy on matters ranging from labor disputes, conservation,34 
and civil rights35 to national security36 and war.37 
B. Presidential Directives as Statutes? 
Over the past century, the federal judiciary has grappled with various 
interpretive questions surrounding presidential directives. The questions of 
meaning include, for example, what qualifies as an environmental 
 
TE(“president! proclam!” /s interp! or constru! or mean!); adv: TE(“president! memorand!” /s 
interp! or constru! or mean!). 
31 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 121 (“[Roosevelt] was the first president to regularly use 
unilateral directives for major policy purposes.”). The greatest spike was during the 1930s and 
1940s—the time of the Great Depression and World War II. See id. at 162 (noting that Franklin 
Roosevelt issued 3,522 executive orders, “far more than any president before or since”). Presidents 
today still issue significant directives at a high rate. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT 
PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 83 (2003) (reporting, based on 
an empirical study, that the number of significant directives increased beginning in the mid-
twentieth century). 
32 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 121 (calculating that Theodore Roosevelt issued 1,081 orders 
while in office, while his predecessors had issued a combined total of 1,262). 
33 See HOWELL supra note 31, at 84 (“The rise of significant executive orders reflects the general 
growth of presidential power in the modern era.” (citation omitted)); Alexander Bolton & Sharece 
Thrower, Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 656 (2016) (asserting 
that nineteenth-century orders “tended to be more ceremonial and less substantively broad”). 
34 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 124-51 (discussing Theodore Roosevelt’s executive orders 
pertaining to labor conflicts, the eight-hour government workday, forest reserves, and wildlife refuges). 
35 See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303, 14303 (Oct. 13, 1967) (establishing a directive 
to provide for equal employment opportunities for federal employees); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 
§ 202, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12320 (Sept. 24, 1965) (barring discrimination and requiring affirmative 
action by government contractors on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national origin”); see also 
Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 301, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 1977 (March 6, 1961) (banning discrimination by 
government contractors with respect to “race, creed, color, or national origin”); RUTH P. MORGAN, 
THE PRESIDENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS: POLICY-MAKING BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 46-50 (1970) 
(discussing Exec. Order No. 10,925 as President Kennedy’s “first major civil rights move”). 
36 See subsection III.B.2.a (discussing orders issued under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act blocking transactions with countries that posed threats to national security). 
37 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizing the 
exclusion of “any person” from designated “military areas”). 
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“emergency”;38 which arrangements count as government contracts;39 
whether a directive creates a private right of action;40 whether a directive 
authorizes “back pay” in government-initiated actions,41 and the meaning of 
terms like “banking institution,”42 “transfer,”43 and even “infant.”44 Courts 
have employed a variety of methods to interpret these directives. But one 
common theme emerges: federal courts have repeatedly asserted that 
presidential directives should be treated just like statutes.45 
 
38 See APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 624-27 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting Exec. Order No. 
12,580, § 2(e)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2924 (Jan. 23, 1987), which authorizes the Environmental 
Protection Agency to handle “emergency removal actions” and permits other agencies to handle 
“removal actions other than emergencies” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980). 
39 See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744, 746-49 (D. Md. 1976) 
(holding that leases for oil and gas rights qualified as government contracts within the meaning of 
Exec. Order No. 11,246, §201, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), which prohibits 
discrimination and mandates affirmative action by government contractors); see also United States 
v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a public utility 
qualified as a government contractor for purposes of Exec. Order No. 11,246), vacated on other grounds 
by 436 U.S. 942 (1978). 
40 Most courts have found that presidential directives do not create private rights of action. 
See, e.g., Helicopter Ass’n Int’l, Inc. v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Utley v. Varian 
Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1987); Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 
235-36 (8th Cir. 1975); Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1967). 
41 See United States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507, 508-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding 
that Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), implicitly authorized back pay). 
42 See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 480-82 (1949) (holding that an association of musical 
composers was a “banking institution” under the definition in Exec. Order 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897 
(June 14, 1941)). 
43 See Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 471, 472-74 (1951) (holding that an attachment levy was 
not a “transfer” within the meaning of Exec. Order 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897 (Jun 14, 1941)). 
44 See United States v. Best & Co., 86 F.2d 23, 23-24, 28 (C.C.P.A. 1936) (holding that a 
presidential proclamation, which placed an extra import duty on “infants’ outerwear,” applied to 
wool knit sweaters that were designed for children between the ages of two and six). 
45 See, e.g., Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (“We approach the construction 
of [an executive order] as we would approach the construction of legislation in this field.”); De Kay 
v. United States, 280 F. 465, 472 (1st Cir. 1922) (“In construing the proclamation of the President 
the same rule of construction must be applied as in the construction of statutes . . . .”); Singh v. 
Gantner, 503 F.Supp.2d 592, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In the construction and interpretation of a 
statute or an Executive Order, accepted canons of statutory construction must be applied.”); United 
States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F.Supp.2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Court interprets Executive 
Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes.”); see also Utley, 811 F.2d at 1284-86 (applying 
the Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), test for statutes, as well as “elemental canon[s] of statutory 
construction” in concluding that an executive order did not create an implied private right of action) 
(internal citations omitted); Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1199 (D. Utah 2004) 
(“The test used to determine whether a statute has been repealed is also used for an executive 
order.”) (quoting Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.Supp. 784, 829 (D. 
Minn. 1994)). Relatedly, lower federal courts have assumed that the same severability rules apply to 
statutes and presidential directives. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 
F.3d 904, 917 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The test for whether a valid portion of an otherwise unconstitutional 
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An early case vividly illustrates this assumption. One of the most notable 
decisions in interpretive history is Holy Trinity Church v. United States, where 
the Supreme Court advised that the “spirit” should prevail over the “letter” 
of a statute.46 A federal court of appeals in De Kay v. United States extended 
this rationale to presidential directives.47 
The De Kay case arose out of a rather unusual set of circumstances. A 
1916 Supreme Court ruling (known as the “Killits decision”) declared that 
federal courts lacked the common law power to suspend criminal 
sentences.48 The Killits decision created quite a stir: Lower federal courts 
had suspended sentences for decades; an estimated 2000 individuals had 
benefited from such grace.49 Would those people now have to be 
resentenced and possibly sent to jail? The Supreme Court anticipated these 
concerns, suggesting in its decision that a “complete remedy may be 
afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power.”50 
President Woodrow Wilson soon responded, issuing a proclamation that 
granted what some described as an “unprecedented . . . blanket pardon.”51 
Wilson “grant[ed] a full amnesty and pardon to all persons under suspended 
sentences of United States courts . . . and to all persons, defendants in said courts, 
 
statute can be severed also applies to executive orders.”); In re Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 
1990) (applying the statutory standard to an executive order); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999) (assuming, without deciding, that “the severability 
standard for statutes also applies to Executive Orders”). I found only two decisions that clearly 
questioned the assumption that presidential directives should be treated like statutes. In the first, 
the court recognized that its own precedents treated executive orders like statutes and followed suit. 
See City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1238 (9th Cir. 2018). In the second, the 
court was primarily concerned with the validity of the executive order at issue. See Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Reagan, 665 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 1987) (“[T]here are no established 
principles of interpretation for Executive Orders . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 870 F.2d 723, 724 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the executive order and not commenting on any interpretive questions). 
Both decisions did, at least, acknowledge the need for interpretive principles in this area. 
46 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its 
makers.”). In that case, the Court held that the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, which by its terms 
barred “labor or service of any kind” by “any foreigner,” applied only to “cheap, unskilled labor”; 
thus, the Holy Trinity Church could retain the services of an English pastor. See id. at 458-65, 472 
(“[T]he intent of Congress was simply to stay the influx of . . . cheap unskilled labor.”). 
47 280 F. 465 (1st. Cir. 1922). 
48 Ex parte United States (Killits), 242 U.S. 27, 42, 51-53 (1916). The case was associated with 
Judge Milton Killits, whose decision was subject to mandamus review. See Ernest Morris, Some 
Phases of the Pardoning Power, 12 A.B.A. J. 183, 185 (1926). 
49 See Charles L. Chute, A Probation System in the United States Courts, 11 VA. L. REG. 18, 19 
(1925) (“Previous to this decision, a great many Federal judges had suspended sentence[s] . . . .”). 
50 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 52. 
51 See Chute, supra note 49, at 19 (“President Wilson did the unprecedented thing of issuing a 
blanket pardon to these men and women. Had he not done so, all . . . would have had to be returned 
to court for sentenc[ing].”). 
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in cases where pleas of guilty were entered or verdicts of guilty returned prior 
to June 15, 1916, and in which no sentences have been imposed.”52 
Meanwhile, in April 1915, Henry De Kay and a banking associate were 
convicted of bank fraud.53 De Kay was still in the process of challenging his 
conviction—and had not yet been sentenced—when President Wilson issued 
the “blanket pardon.”54 De Kay argued that the clemency extended to his 
case.55 After all, the proclamation expressly applied “to all persons, 
defendants in [United States] courts, in cases where . . . verdicts of guilty 
[were] returned prior to June 15, 1916, and in which no sentences have been 
imposed.”56 De Kay was not sentenced until February 1920.57 
The court of appeals announced that “[i]n construing the proclamation of 
the President the same rule of construction must be applied as in the 
construction of statutes.”58 “Applying the same rule of construction as was 
applied in Church of the Holy Trinity,” the court held that, although De Kay’s 
case “‘may be within the letter of the statute,’ it is ‘not within its spirit.’”59 
The proclamation was “stated in general terms” but “must be restricted to the 
defendants” it was meant to benefit: those “whose sentences had been illegally 
suspended.”60 In short, De Kay was out of luck.61 
In subsequent years, courts continued to assume that presidential directives 
should be treated like statutes.62 To be sure, this assumption does not resolve 
interpretive disputes. Although the Supreme Court has moved away from Holy 
Trinity, the Court has not adopted a single method of statutory interpretation, 
much less sought to make that approach precedential.63 The approach to 
 
52 Proclamation on Amnesty and Pardon (June 14, 1917), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8317 (New York, Bureau of National Literature, 
1921) (emphasis added). 
53 De Kay v. United States, 280 F. 465, 465-66 (1st Cir. 1922). 
54 Id. at 471. 
55 Id. at 465-66, 471-72. 
56 Id. at 473 (internal quotations omitted). 
57 See id. at 472 (noting that on February 6, 1920, De Kay was sentenced to a five-year prison 
term). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 473 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 473-74. 
62 See supra note 45 (collecting cases). 
63 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754, 1757-78 (2010) (“Methodological 
stare decisis . . . is generally absent from federal statutory interpretation . . . .”); see also Sydney 
Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1863, 1870 (2008) (arguing that “as a matter of policy, courts should give extra-strong stare decisis 
effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation”). Although the Court pays more attention to the text 
than it did in the past, the Court has not formally adopted “textualism.” See John F. Manning, The 
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115, 130-131. 
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statutes is even more “eclectic” in the lower federal courts, which hear the bulk 
of interpretive questions surrounding presidential directives.64 But I argue that 
this assumption presents not only a practical but also a theoretical challenge. 
To the extent one believes that constitutional theory and institutional 
considerations should inform interpretive method (as many scholars do), 
presidential directives should be treated as distinct instruments. In short, 
presidential directives are not statutes. 
C. The Relevance of Structure and Institutional Setting: 
Lessons from Statutory Debates 
As Jerry Mashaw and others have observed, “[a]ny theory of statutory 
interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.”65 In debates over 
statutory interpretation, scholars focus (appropriately enough) on the 
constitutional provisions governing Congress—primarily Article I.66 
Statutory theorists are also attentive to the subconstitutional rules and 
procedures governing Congress (like committee hearings and the Senate 
 
64 As scholars have demonstrated through meticulous empirical studies, lower courts do not 
have “a single approach” to statutory interpretation but rather display “intentional eclecticism.” Abbe 
R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302, 1353 (2018); see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the 
Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 66 (2018) (confirming that “lower courts’ interpretive methods 
remain eclectic”). My research suggests that judges today approach presidential directives with a 
similar degree of “eclecticism.” 
65 Mashaw, supra note 6, at 1686; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 
(2011) (“[Lawyers interpreting statutes] must decide . . . what division of political authority among 
different branches of government and civil society is best, all things considered.”). Notably, not all 
theorists agree with this point. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 909 (2003) (“The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say 
a great deal about . . . statutory interpretation.”). Adrian Vermeule has advocated a version of 
textualism based primarily on concerns about the (limited) institutional capacities of the federal 
judiciary. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4-5, 150, 181, 186-87 (2006). 
66 To be sure, statutory theories do not focus exclusively on Article I. Some debates over 
statutory interpretation emphasize (at least in part) the meaning of the Article III judicial power. 
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory 
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993-95, 997, 1087 (2001) (arguing that “the 
original materials surrounding Article III’s judicial power assume an eclectic approach to statutory 
interpretation, open to understanding the letter of a statute in pursuance of the spirit of the law and 
in light of fundamental values”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2001) (arguing that the “evidence of the original understanding of ‘the 
judicial Power’ in America is mixed, but ultimately it does not support the equity of the statute,” 
that is, the idea that “the judicial power ‘to say what the law is’ originally encompassed an inherent 
equitable power to reshape statutes without regard to legislative intent”). Ryan Doerfler has 
advocated a “‘conversation’ model of interpretation” that draws on due process principles of fair 
notice. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 1032-34, 
1042-43 (2017). 
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filibuster). We can see this point vividly in recent debates over textualism and 
the use of legislative history. 
Significantly, these statutory debates reflect an important (if at times 
implicit) assumption underlying interpretive theory: the process for creating 
a document tells us a good deal about the nature of that document and should 
thus inform interpretive method. As I argue below, this assumption 
underscores the importance of looking at the distinct institutional setting of 
presidential directives. 
Notably, statutory interpretive theory has long been based on 
assumptions about the legislative process. For example, legal process 
purposivism urged interpreters to assume that “the legislature was made up 
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”67 Under 
this approach, interpreters should discern the primary purpose underlying 
a statute and do their best to carry out that purpose in individual cases.68 
Beginning in the 1980s, however, legal scholars (influenced by public choice 
theory) built important interpretive theories based on a less rosy picture of 
the lawmaking process.69 
Modern statutory textualism arose out of these interpretive debates.70 
Statutory textualists view the legislative process as a means to protect the 
interests of political minorities. As textualism’s leading defender John 
Manning has emphasized, the bicameralism and presentment process of 
Article I, Section 7, creates a supermajority requirement for every piece of 
legislation.71 These procedures thus also—especially when supplemented by 
specific rules like the filibuster and committee gatekeeping—grant “political 
minorities extraordinary power to block legislation or insist upon 
 
67 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958). 
68 See id. at 1374 (advising that a court should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately 
in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can,” although a court ought never to “give the 
words [of the statute] . . . a meaning they will not bear”). 
69 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1533 (1987) (“A model of dynamic statutory interpretation . . . would help to ameliorate some of the 
biases attendant to the legislative process.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding 
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226 
(1986) (noting that “traditional methods of statutory interpretation” can “encourage[] passage of 
public-regarding legislation and impede[] passage of interest group bargains”). 
70 Notably, early textualists drew heavily on public choice theory. See John F. Manning, Second-
Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (2010) (discussing this history and arguing 
that textualists gradually moved away from such a pessimistic vision of congressional lawmaking). 
71 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Manning, supra note 66, at 74-75. Statutory textualism has been 
most forcefully defended by John Manning. But earlier theories also emphasized the Article I 
lawmaking process. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (1997); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 539 (1983) (“Under article I . . . support is 
not enough . . . . If the support cannot be transmuted into an enrolled bill, nothing happens.”). 
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compromise as the price of assent.”72 Statutory textualists argue that judges 
respect the “procedural rights” of political minorities by adhering to the 
specific provisions of the text.73 
Textualists’ assumptions about the legislative process also inform their view 
of legislative history. For example, textualists worry that legislators might 
manipulate the legislative record—intentionally inserting something that they 
could not convince their colleagues to enact into law.74 At a minimum, 
textualists suggest, committee reports and floor statements are likely to be 
unreliable evidence of the statutory deal.75 Accordingly, reliance on legislative 
history could undermine the protections for political minorities.76 
Recently, scholars and jurists have challenged modern statutory 
textualism with competing theories of Article I and the lawmaking process.77 
In a nutshell, this commentary suggests that textualists “misunderstand 
 
72 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 77 
(2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides?]; see also Manning, supra note 70, at 1314 (“The 
legislative procedures adopted by each House . . . accentuate” the protections for political 
minorities). 
73 See Manning, What Divides?, supra note 72, at 77 (“[T]extualists believe that adjusting a 
statute’s semantic detail unacceptably risks diluting that crucial procedural right.”). Proposed 
legislation may be subject to a Senate filibuster. Under Rule 22, a cloture motion to end debate on 
the measure requires three-fifths of the Senate (sixty votes). See C. Lawrence Evans, Politics of 
Congressional Reform, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 490, 510 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder 
eds., 2005). For a discussion of the role of committees as gatekeepers, see John R. Boyce & Diane P. 
Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1-3 
(2002) (discussing how legislation may get blocked by congressional committees). 
74 See SCALIA, supra note 71, at 34 (“[T]he more courts have relied upon legislative history, the 
less worthy of reliance it has become.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994) (“[Legislative history is] slanted, drafted by 
the staff and perhaps by private interest groups.”). 
75 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 376; Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 347, 364-66 (2005). 
76 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675, 
719 (1997) (allowing Congress to specify details in the legislative history “threat[ens] . . . the 
constitutional safeguards of bicameralism and presentment”). Notably, textualists do not foreclose 
all reliance on legislative history. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 382 (recognizing that 
courts might look to legislative history to determine the meaning of a technical term); John F. 
Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on Some Texts but Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 570-71 (2016) 
(same). 
77 Notably, a number of scholars have powerfully responded to the constitutional and 
institutional assumptions of modern textualism. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (2006) (arguing that textualists focus too much on “the 
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures” at the expense of other separation of powers 
principles, including the judiciary’s role in blocking “unwise or unjust government action”); see also 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2009) 
(arguing that textualism has a tendency to become “progressively more radical and, therefore, less 
workable” over time). The discussion in this Section does not aim to be comprehensive. 
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Congress.”78 According to these commentators, interpreters can often best 
discern what lawmakers believed they were doing (including any 
compromises that they reached) by looking to sources outside the text. Thus, 
while textualists emphasize Article I, Section 7, Judge Robert Katzmann and 
Victoria Nourse point to Article I, Section 5, which grants each house the 
power to craft “the Rules of its Proceedings.”79 Each house has exercised that 
power to delegate matters—such as the drafting of legislation—to 
committees, which then prepare reports for the entire body.80 Some empirical 
work suggests that “members [of Congress] are more likely to vote . . . based 
on a reading of the legislative history than on a reading of the statute itself.”81 
In other words, legislative history may very well be the best evidence of the 
statutory deal. Accordingly, as Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman argue, “[i]f 
one were to construct a theory of interpretation based on how members 
themselves engage in the process of statutory creation, a text-based theory is 
the last theory one would construct.”82 
This Article does not aim to resolve which theorists have the better 
argument as to statutory interpretation. Instead, I highlight these debates for 
two reasons. First, they underscore the extent to which interpretive theory 
depends on both constitutional structure and institutional setting. Second, 
they show that, for statutes, the emphasis is—as it should be—on the 
provisions and procedures governing Congress. This theoretical debate thus 
suggests that any theory for presidential directives should focus on the 
constitutional provisions and procedures governing the President. 
 
78 I borrow this phrase from Victoria Nourse’s illuminating work on statutory interpretation. 
E.g., Nourse, supra note 6, at 1136. Notably, Nourse believes that many current theories—not simply 
textualism—misunderstand Congress. She urges all interpreters to learn more about congressional 
procedure. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 7, 8-9, 15, 17, 
64-95 (2016). 
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
80 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 9-13, 48 (2014) (“Congress intends that 
its work should be understood through its established institutional processes and practices”); 
NOURSE, supra note 78, at 12, 161-81 (“Article I, section 5, the Rules of Proceedings Clause, supports 
the constitutionality of legislative evidence.”) 
81 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 
905-06, 968 (2013) (drawing on a survey of 137 congressional staffers responsible for drafting 
legislation). This work built on the pioneering study of Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter, who 
interviewed sixteen staffers on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576-79 
(2002). One limitation of these studies is that the authors talked to staffers rather than members of 
Congress. Id. at 579; see also John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1936 
n.151 (2015) (questioning Gluck and Bressman’s choice to interview staffers when they are not the 
ones with “the power to enact legislation”). 
82 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 81, at 969. 
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II. AN ARTICLE II-BASED THEORY 
The Constitution does not mention, much less spell out a procedure for 
creating, presidential directives. Nor does any federal statute prescribe an 
approach; the Supreme Court has held that the Administrative Procedure 
Act does not apply to the President.83 But I argue that Article II, 
particularly the Opinions Clause, gives the President considerable 
discretion to structure his decisionmaking process. Since at least the 1930s, 
Presidents have used that power to invite executive officials to draft, 
negotiate over, and redraft directives. 
This interagency consultation process has important implications for 
interpreting presidential directives. Although the President alone is 
responsible for the final decision, many directives do not reflect his preferred 
substantive policy. The President may opt, after consultation, to split the 
difference among agencies. I argue (in Part III) that courts can best give effect 
to the structure the President has created—with its possibility for 
compromise and less-than-effective directives—by hewing closely to the text. 
A. The Opinions Clause and Presidential Decisionmaking 
One assumption of interpretive theory is that we can learn a great deal 
about the nature of a document—and thus the proper approach to 
interpreting that document—by understanding the process by which it is 
created.84 Although neither the Constitution nor any federal statute 
prescribes a process for crafting presidential directives, I argue that a rarely-
emphasized provision of Article II empowers the President to institute such 
a procedure: the Opinions Clause. The Clause provides that the President 
 
83 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 800-01 (1992) (holding that “textual silence 
is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA”); see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 
U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (holding that “[t]he actions of the President cannot be reviewed under the APA 
because the President is not an ‘agency’ under” the APA). Although Franklin focused on arbitrary 
and capricious review, courts and commentators have found or assumed (reasonably enough) that 
presidential directives are exempt from the procedural requirements as well. See Kevin M. Stack, 
The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 318 (2006) 
[hereinafter Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers] (noting that while “executive agencies must 
comply with the APA’s procedural requirements,” the President need not do so); accord Adam J. 
White, Executive Orders as Lawful Limits on Agency Policymaking Discretion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1569, 1569 (2018). Indeed, this “procedural exemption” may be the most important implication, given 
that plaintiffs can challenge many presidential directives by suing the enforcement official under the 
APA. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (permitting, albeit without discussion 
of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, a suit “challeng[ing] the application of [the] entry restrictions” in 
the third travel ban); Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. 
L. REV. 1171, 1194 (2009) (establishing that plaintiffs can “in almost all cases” sue “the subordinate 
federal official who acts upon the President’s directive”). 
84 See supra Section I.C (discussing statutory debates). 
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“may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”85 
As background, I offer a brief overview of the literature on the Opinions 
Clause. To the extent scholars have discussed this provision, they have often 
focused on what the Clause says about other parts of Article II. Some scholars 
argue that the Opinions Clause undermines a central tenet of unitary 
executive theory.86 Unitarians assert that, by “vest[ing]” the “executive 
Power” in the President, Article II grants him control over all discretionary 
executive action, free from congressional interference.87 Skeptics respond 
that if the Vesting Clause were that broad, the Opinions Clause would be 
superfluous; a President with unlimited authority over the executive branch 
could presumably “require the Opinion, in writing” of his subordinates.88 
A few scholars have identified a more affirmative function for the 
Opinions Clause. At least if one accepts that Congress has some power to 
structure the executive branch, the Opinions Clause places an important 
constraint on that power.89 Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein have suggested 
that the Opinions Clause ensures that the President may “consult with and 
 
85 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 
82 VA. L. REV. 647, 647 (1996) (describing the provision as “one of the least discussed but most 
intriguing clauses of the United States Constitution”). 
86 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1994) (arguing that to read the Opinions Clause as “something more than a 
redundancy,” one must assume “a vastly narrower conception” of presidential power than unitary 
executive theory); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 2035 (2011) (discussing how the Opinions Clause casts doubt on the notion that “Article 
II’s Vesting Clause confers illimitable presidential removal power”). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992) (“Unitary executive 
theorists	. . . .	conclude that the President alone possesses all of the executive power.”). 
88 See supra note 86. Unitarians have offered answers to this challenge but have also 
acknowledged that the Opinions Clause may well be redundant. See Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 585 (1994) 
(suggesting that the Clause may prevent the President from demanding an opinion on “personal 
legal problems”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 30-31 (arguing that the Clause is redundant but still important because it deters Congress from 
passing a statute directing officials to report to Congress, rather than the President). In recent work, 
Sai Prakash has argued that the inclusion of the Opinions Clause served a political function by 
reassuring early Americans, who were accustomed to executives with “councils,” that “the president 
would not lack for advice.” SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE 
BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 194 (2015); see also infra notes 
106–109 and accompanying text (discussing those early councils). 
89 Akhil Amar has offered an account that would be consistent with many views of Article II. 
He suggests that the Opinions Clause prohibits the President from “requir[ing]” opinions from 
other branches—most notably, the judiciary. See Amar, supra note 85, at 655-56. 
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demand answers” from agency officials, so that he can evaluate their actions.90 
Under this view, the Clause provides a crucial mechanism for the President 
to oversee lower-level officials in both the executive and the independent 
agencies, without interference from Congress.91 
 
90 See Neil Thomas Proto, The Opinion Clause and Presidential Decision-Making, 44 MO. L. REV. 
185, 201 (1979) (“[T]he Opinion Clause is an affirmative power” that ensures the President may 
“gather[] the information . . . necessary to control and direct the energy and resources of the 
executive branch.”); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in 
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 197, 200 (1986) (noting that the Opinions Clause grants 
the President a “procedural” power to “control and supervise” officials, without congressional 
interference); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the 
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-
Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1642 (2012) (“[T]he Opinions Clause 
supports the claim that the president must enjoy the ability to oversee the execution of federal 
law . . . .”). Notably, as Professor Strauss has underscored in other work, the Opinions Clause allows 
the President to get information from—and thereby check up on—officials; the Clause does not 
indicate that the President may instruct federal officials to disregard a statutory duty. See Peter L. 
Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 696, 727 (2007) (emphasizing that the Opinions Clause does not authorize the President to 
“keep . . . officers from performing any such duty as the Congress may statutorily have assigned to 
them (and not to him)”). Relatedly, scholars have debated whether statutes that confer power on 
agency officials should be construed to permit the President to direct the actions of those officials. 
Compare Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing that 
the President should presumptively have such authority over officials in executive agencies), with 
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 83, at 267 (contending that “the President has 
directive authority . . . only when the statute expressly grants power to the President in name”). 
This Article takes no position on that question of statutory interpretation. 
91 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 90, at 200 (arguing that this procedural supervisory power 
extends to both executive and independent agencies). A federal agency is typically considered 
“independent” if the President cannot remove the agency’s leaders at will. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 492 (1987). It seems to be an open 
question whether the Opinions Clause permits the President to demand opinions from the leaders 
of independent agencies. In separate (and later) work, Cass Sunstein along with Larry Lessig 
suggested (tentatively) that the Opinions Clause may not apply to “nonexecutive” agencies. See 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 86, at 35-36; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may 
require the Opinion . . . of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments”) (emphasis 
added). But as Martin Flaherty has pointed out, that argument relies on an assumption that 
individuals at the Founding made a sharp distinction between “executive” and “nonexecutive” 
departments. Flaherty persuasively argues that is unlikely. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1796 (1996); see also PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 200 (arguing 
the term “executive departments” simply underscored that the President could not demand opinions 
from the Chief Justice—as had earlier drafts (emphasis added)). Accordingly, I agree with other 
scholars that the Clause is most reasonably read to apply to both types of agencies. See MICHAEL 
W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING (forthcoming Nov. 2020) 
(manuscript at 63-64, 193) (on file with author) (stating that the Opinions Clause applies to both 
the independent and the executive agencies and limits Congress’s power to make top officials 
“independent of presidential oversight”); J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 
2079, 2134 & n.239 (1989) (noting that Presidents may in effect delegate to and order independent 
agencies as well as executive agencies); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 646 (1984) (citing as supporting 
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But I argue that the Opinions Clause does not simply provide the 
President with a tool to check up on his subordinates. The provision also 
invites the President to seek advice and counsel—an “Opinion, in writing”—
from officials, so that he can make a more informed decision.92 Indeed, the 
text of the Clause suggests that the information-gathering function may be 
its primary purpose.93 The provision authorizes the President to ask 
“principal Officer[s]” for advice about “any Subject relating to the Duties of 
their respective Offices”—that is, the precise issues on which the officials will 
have greater expertise.94 
Other structural features of Article II provide some assurance that the 
President will listen to such advice. The Appointments Clause empowers the 
President to nominate those “principal Officers.”95 Although the Senate must 
confirm each nominee, “they cannot themselves choose—they can only ratify 
or reject the choice of the President,” leaving him with the power to select an 
alternative.96 One presumes that most Presidents select individuals who (the 
Presidents believe) will offer cogent and helpful advice. Along the same lines, 
to the extent that the President genuinely invites candor, his removal power 
will encourage a subordinate official to provide a candid opinion.97 
 
evidence that both Presidents and independent agencies have understood the Opinions Clause to 
cover independent agencies); see also Kagan, supra note 90, at 2324 (noting the scholarly consensus 
that the President may exercise a “‘procedural’ supervisory authority” over both types of agencies, 
and that the Opinions Clause may bar congressional interference). 
92 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. A few scholars have recognized that the Clause serves this 
function, albeit with very little discussion. See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Reorganizing the Federal 
Executive Branch: The Limits of Institutionalization, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 461, 463 (1970) 
(noting that one plausible purpose of the Clause was to “provide [the President] with informed 
advice”); see also PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 194 (noting the Clause enables the President to “demand 
opinions related to facts, law, and public policy so that he may make informed decisions about law 
execution, foreign affairs, and the military”). 
93 The origins of the Opinions Clause are “somewhat obscure.” Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 
86, at 33; see also Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 485 (2008) (describing the provision as “one of the seemingly 
strangest clauses in the original Constitution”). For a brief discussion of the history, see infra notes 
106–109 and accompanying text. 
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Of course, as Akhil Amar has asserted, it seems likely that 
the President has discretion to determine which subjects relate to the duties of a given officer. See 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 326 (2012) (noting that the 
President may determine what is “so closely ‘relat[ed] to’ a given department head’s official portfolio 
as to warrant a formal opinion”). 
95 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . . .”). 
96 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(noting that the Senate “may defeat one choice of the Executive” but “could not be sure, if they 
withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite”). 
97 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (asserting that the President must have 
“unrestricted power” to remove federal officials); see also Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 
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Article II thus gives the President an important tool to learn from 
officials before he issues a directive—to invite them to help him ensure the 
faithful execution of the laws.98 I argue that Presidents have exercised this 
power in structuring the decisionmaking process for presidential directives. 
As described in the next Section, Presidents have sought out considerable 
input from agency officials prior to issuing presidential directives. Agency 
officials draft, negotiate over, and redraft the text of a given directive—
debating (and often disagreeing over) not only the best policy but also the 
means of effectuating that policy. In this way, Presidents gather 
information—advice on both whether to issue a directive and precisely what 
any such directive should say. 
One might reasonably ask whether the Opinions Clause is a necessary 
source of power. That is, couldn’t the President ask for advice, absent this 
provision? The answer depends in part on one’s background assumptions 
about Article II. For unitary executive theorists, the Opinions Clause is 
unnecessary. The President’s background “executive Power” would enable 
him to ask for opinions, absent interference from Congress.99 
But for those with a less expansive view of presidential power, the 
Opinions Clause serves an important function—in two different respects. 
First, the Clause ensures that the President may seek advice from 
subordinates. That is, the provision places some constraint on Congress’s 
power to interfere with that information-gathering function. (The Clause 
thus provides some support for the President’s exemption from the 
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.100) 
Second, the Opinions Clause makes clear that the President has no duty 
to engage in such consultation. The Clause, after all, states that he “may 
require” the written opinion of agency officials.101 Accordingly, the President 
may also opt not to seek advice. In this way, the Opinions Clause differs from 
 
U.S. 602, 629, 631-32 (1935) (upholding “for cause” removal provisions for officials in independent 
agencies). If the President did not genuinely invite candor, of course, the official might worry about 
losing her job if she offered an “Opinion” that conflicted with the President’s preferred position. 
But under the analysis here, that would be akin to a presidential decision not to seek out advice—a 
power that the President has under the Opinions Clause. 
98 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed	.	.	.	.”). 
99 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
100 To the extent that Congress imposed a procedural scheme, that would arguably violate the 
President’s power to structure the manner through which he seeks out information from 
subordinates. Cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (establishing that absent 
“an express statement by Congress” the Court would not construe the APA to apply to the 
President); supra note 83. This Article does not, however, aim to resolve whether Congress could 
impose some kind of procedural scheme. 
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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the Take Care Clause, which provides that the President “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”102 Although scholars debate whether the 
Take Care Clause imposes duties on the President,103 I assume for present 
purposes that the Clause does impose certain obligations. Even if one makes 
that assumption,104 the Opinions Clause clarifies that the President has an 
important choice of means in carrying out such duties: The President may, 
but need not, seek out advice from his subordinates in determining how to 
execute the laws. 
The Constitution thus gives the President the choice to make an informed 
or ill-informed decision.105 In this respect, the Opinions Clause differs 
markedly from analogous provisions in early state constitutions. Those state 
provisions not only invited governors to gather advice from an executive 
“council” but required the governors to obtain the “consent” or “approval” of 
the council before taking certain actions.106 The federal Constitution created 
no such mandatory council.107 The President has the discretion to seek as 
much, or as little, advice as he chooses from his subordinates. 
 
102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
103 Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 87, at 1198 n.221 (asserting that “the Take Care 
Clause bolsters the power-grant reading of the Vesting Clause of Article II”), with, e.g., Evan 
Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 377 (1989) (“[T]he [T]ake 
[C]are [C]lause is better understood as a directive that the President must execute the law 
consistently with Congress’ will, rather than as a grant of exogenously defined power . . . .”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) 
(asserting that the Take Care Clause creates “a duty, not a license”). See also Tara Leigh Grove, 
Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1322 n.41 (2014) (suggesting that “the Take 
Care Clause may be both a grant of power and the imposition of a duty”). 
104 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842, 1875-
78 (2015) (relying in part on the Take Care Clause in arguing that “a duty to supervise [officials] 
represents a basic precept of our federal constitutional structure”); see also David M. Driesen, Toward 
a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2009) (“[T]he Constitution 
imposes a duty upon the President and all other executive branch officials to obey the law . . . .”). 
105 See also infra Sections III.B.1, IV.A. 
106 See PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 40-42 (discussing how under some state constitutions, 
certain “exercises of [gubernatorial] power required the ‘advice,’ the ‘consent,’ or the ‘advice and 
consent’ of a council”); see also AMAR, supra note 94, at 326 (“In sharp contrast to many state 
governors who constitutionally had to win the votes of council majorities for various proposed 
gubernatorial initiatives, the president would be his own man.”). 
107 The Opinions Clause grew out of proposals to create a “council” of advisors for the 
President. See MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 57-58, 62-63 (discussing the proposals for an executive 
council); Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1796-98 (describing proposed councils comprising the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Secretaries for various departments, and leaders of the House and 
Senate). Interestingly, none of the proposals would have given the council veto power over any 
presidential decision. Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1796-98; accord MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 57-
58 (emphasizing that the Framers “reject[ed the] model of a council to advise and restrain the 
executive magistrate, which existed in almost all the states”); see also Proto, supra note 90, at 193-95 
(tracing the Opinions Clause to proposals for a “council of state” and “Privy Council,” whose 
opinions would not be binding on the executive). Ultimately, the entire “council” idea was 
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But this discretionary power also comes with an important corollary: 
Absent an executive council, the President must take responsibility for his 
(informed or ill-informed) decisions; he has no one to blame if things go 
wrong.108 As Akhil Amar and others have underscored, the Opinions 
Clause “concentrate[s] accountability for presidential actions on the 
president himself.”109 
B. The Interagency Consultation Process 
Article II gives the President considerable power to structure the process 
by which presidential directives are created. But the existing structure is 
largely unknown in the legal academic literature. This Article thus offers a 
window into that process—drawing on both political science research and my 
own interviews with executive branch officials from the Trump, Obama, 
George W. Bush, and other administrations.110 Notably, these officials could 
not share details about particular directives. The process for crafting 
directives takes place almost entirely behind closed doors; the details are not 
publicly available for many years (if at all).111 But the officials offered 
illuminating insights about the process itself. 
A presidential directive may originate in one of two ways. The directive 
might be “top down”: the President has a policy that he hopes to effectuate, 
 
abandoned—apparently in part out of a concern that the President would blame the council for bad 
decisions. Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1797. 
108 See supra note 107. To be sure, Presidents may still attempt to shift blame to others. But the 
Opinions Clause is designed so as to make that more difficult: the President cannot claim that he 
was bound by the decision of an executive council. 
109 AMAR, supra note 94, at 326-27 (arguing that “the animating spirit of the opinions clause” 
was “to concentrate accountability for presidential actions on the president himself ” and that “the 
central purpose” of the Opinions Clause was “to prevent presidents from evading blame by hiding 
behind the opinions of advisers meeting in private”); accord MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 57-58, 
62-63 (discussing the Convention and Ratification debates over the Opinions Clause and 
emphasizing that the Founders sought to ensure the President’s “responsibility to the people”); 
PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 194 (“[T]he word ‘opinions’ suggests that the ultimate decisions were 
the president’s, not the principal officers’.”); Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1798 (agreeing that the 
Opinions Clause “furthers presidential accountability”); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and 
Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607, 628 (2009) (“[T]his structure was geared to 
ensure accountability . . . .”); Proto, supra note 90, at 194 (suggesting that the history behind the 
Clause shows “the President has singular and ultimate accountability for his own decisions”). 
110 See supra note 9 (listing interviewees). 
111 See Andrew Rudalevige, Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism, 42 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 138, 147-48 (2012) (noting the Office of Management and Budget 
keeps a file on every executive order and that as of his 2012 article, “some executive order files 
[were] available up to late 1987”). 
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so he asks an agency or White House official to draft a directive.112 
Alternatively, the directive might be “bottom up”: an agency wants the 
executive branch to adopt a policy, but it lacks the authority to bind other 
agencies itself.113 In either event, the directive tends to go through a fairly 
involved procedure. 
1. Executive Orders and Proclamations 
The process for issuing some directives—executive orders and 
proclamations—is guided by executive order.114 Current officials still look to 
President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030.115 But as political 
scientist Andrew Rudalevige has observed, the process—both on paper and 
on the ground—goes back much further.116 Beginning in the 1930s, Presidents 
issued a series of executive orders creating an interagency consultation 
process that largely mirrors the process used today.117 Moreover, Kennedy’s 
Executive Order 11,030 and its predecessors supply only the basic outlines; 
many of the details discussed below are based on interviews or political 
science research. (The footnotes make clear the source of the information.)118 
 
112 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (noting that sometimes the President “wants to take some 
action”); see also MAYER, supra note 11, at 61 (“[E]xecutive orders typically either originate 
from	. . . the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of 
presidential action.”). 
113 See, e.g., Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (indicating that an agency may ask for a 
directive, because the President can bind the entire executive branch); see also Rudalevige, supra 
note 111, at 153 (reporting that more than 6 out of every 10 executive orders in his study were 
initiated by federal agencies). 
114 Notably, this process does not apply to “hortatory” directives that, as one former official 
put it, “simply announce ‘National Tree Day.’” De Interview, supra note 9. Such directives go through 
a more streamlined process. See Exec. Order No. 12,080, 43 Fed. Reg. 42,235 (Sept. 18, 1978). Nor 
does the process apply to international agreements. See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 5, 27 Fed. Reg. 
5847, 5848 (June 19, 1962). 
115 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. at 5847. There have been some minor 
modifications. For example, President George W. Bush amended the order to reflect that directives 
were likely to be created by computer, rather than typewriter. See Exec. Order No. 13,403, § 1(a), 71 
Fed. Reg. 28,543, 28,543 (May 12, 2006) (changing from “typewritten” to “prepared”); see also Exec. 
Order No. 12,608, § 2, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617, 34,617 (Sept. 9, 1987) (noting a name change to “the 
Office of Management and Budget”). 
116 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 148 (noting that Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 
6247 in August 1933 was the first that “created a standard process”). 
117 Under orders issued by Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Truman, the Bureau of the 
Budget (the predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget) would review a proposed 
executive order or proclamation; send the draft to the Attorney General for “form and legality” 
review; and the resulting directive would be published in the Federal Register. Exec. Order No. 
10,006, 13 Fed. Reg. 5927, 5927, 5929 (Oct. 9, 1948); Exec. Order No. 7298 (Feb. 18, 1936). 
118 This Part first lays out the typical process for crafting various types of presidential 
directives and then discusses how Presidents sometimes deviate from these procedures. See infra 
subsection II.B.3. 
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a. The Process 
Under Executive Order 11,030, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) oversees the process for an executive order or proclamation.119 Once 
OMB receives a draft directive (which, as noted, has often been written by 
agency officials),120 OMB shares the draft with other agencies that may have 
an interest in the issue. Officials then offer feedback, commenting on both 
policy and legal matters. Agency officials will point out, for example, if a 
statute prohibits that agency from carrying out the directive in the suggested 
manner (or at all).121 
Moreover, officials (and particularly legal counsel) often weigh in on the 
precise wording of the directive at issue.122 Indeed, agency officials “pore[] 
over” these texts—and may get into “heated arguments over the use of a 
particular word”—because the resulting document could impact the power of 
the agency itself.123 One former official remarked, “The more important the 
executive order, the more attention paid to the text.”124 Based on the feedback, 
OMB will redraft the directive and send it out again for comment. Former 
 
119 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, §2(a), 27 Fed. Reg. at 5847 (providing that the “Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget” should oversee the process). President Reagan later modified the order to 
reflect that the Bureau was renamed the Office of Management and Budget. Exec. Order No. 12,608, 
§ 2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 34617. 
120 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. Kennedy’s order specifically contemplates 
that agency officials will often draft the directive. See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 2(a), 27 Fed. Reg. 
at 5847 (requiring the “originating Federal agency” to submit the draft to be reviewed). 
121 See Bies Interview, supra note 9 (noting that agency officials raise both “policy-based” and 
“law-based” objections); Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that the “coordination process” 
is designed in part to make sure the President has the legal authority to issue a directive). 
122 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how agencies “absolutely” argued about the text, 
explaining that “[t]he specific words do matter,” and providing an example: the Secretary of State 
should act “in consultation with” the Treasury Secretary means the two should discuss the matter, 
while “in coordination with” means the Treasury Secretary has a “veto” over the decision); McGahn 
Interview, supra note 9 (stating that a great deal of care goes into the text, because agencies need 
guidance on what to do); Otis Interview, supra note 9 (noting that officials were “very careful” about 
the text); see also Luttig Interview, supra note 9 (recounting how lawyers tend to focus on the text). 
123 Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the language is “pored over,” particularly if 
the order would impact multiple agencies, and that “an incredible amount of work” goes in to 
“resolving differences” among agencies); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that “a lot of care 
would go into the drafting” of the text, “because this is like writing the law for the executive branch,” 
and “[y]ou could get into heated arguments over the use of a particular word”); see also McGahn 
Interview, supra note 9 (agreeing that agencies debate the language, perhaps because they might be 
giving up power, or because they think they are better equipped to implement a given order). 
124 Fonzone Interview, supra note 9; see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (similarly noting that 
more care would be devoted to important directives). 
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officials suggested that many directives go through at least three drafts—and 
three rounds of comments—before leaving OMB.125 
The President is not necessarily absent at this stage of the process. If a 
given directive is highly significant, then White House or Cabinet officials 
may ask the President to weigh in on a dispute among agencies.126 But my 
research suggests that such direct presidential involvement is the exception 
rather than the rule. Agency officials debate most directives among 
themselves—with the oversight of OMB—and the President does not get 
involved until a final draft is ready for him to sign. 
After the agency review, OMB sends the draft directive to the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for “form and 
legality” review.127 That is, OLC’s job is to make sure the executive order 
or proclamation complies with the Constitution and any governing statutes 
or regulations.128 Although there are debates about how searching a review 
OLC provides, at least some directives apparently get stopped (or 
modified) at this stage.129 
The next stop in what one former official described as a “marathon” is the 
White House Staff Secretary.130 Although this position is not well known,131 
 
125 See Egan Interview, supra note 9; see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (indicating that there 
might also “be one or more meetings involving the agencies with the biggest interest to hash out 
differences”). 
126 See Gray Interview, supra note 9 (noting that “the President might get consulted part-way 
through” and he “would make a decision on contested points 1, 2, 3” but would “not be bothered a 
second or third time by appeals” from agency officials); see also Egan Interview, supra note 9 
(asserting that the President “would almost certainly have been briefed and have opportunity to 
provide views” on an important directive). 
127 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 2(b), 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5847 (June 19, 1962) (requiring the 
Attorney General to review “as to both form and legality”). The Attorney General has delegated 
this function to OLC. See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/QK8W-NF64] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (“By 
delegation from the Attorney General, . . . the Office of Legal Counsel provides legal advice to the 
President and all executive branch agencies . . . . All executive orders and substantive proclamations 
proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by the Office of Legal Counsel for form and 
legality . . . .”). 
128 See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary 
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 359-65 (1993); see also Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 
72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 878 (2019) (noting OLC review “does not appear to require any sort of 
rigorous review of the facts underlying the order”). 
129  Kmiec, supra note 128, at 359 (noting “form and legality” letters “may be viewed by some, 
outside of OLC, as mere legal ‘formalities,’” but disputing that notion); see also Luttig Interview, 
supra note 9 (reporting that during his time at OLC, he carefully reviewed each document, but 
stating that the OLC culture is to offer an “expansive understanding” of presidential power). 
130 De Interview, supra note 9. 
131 The position recently got attention, however, because the most recent Supreme Court 
nominee Brett Kavanaugh is a former Staff Secretary. See Jessica Gresko, Senators Spar on Access to 
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the Staff Secretary plays an integral role in the promulgation of every 
presidential document.132 The Staff Secretary reviews the draft directive and 
often engages in another layer of consultation—this time, within the White 
House; the Staff Secretary checks to make sure that “relevant constituencies” 
within the Executive Office of the President are on board with the 
directive.133 Finally (and possibly after some additional edits), the Staff 
Secretary sends the directive to the President.134 
What does the President see? Notably, the President does not receive a 
copy of every comment by agency officials on earlier drafts of the directive. 
As a few former officials put it, the comments range from “thoughtful” to 
“crazy” or even “nonsense.”135 Instead, the President receives three 
documents: (1) the text of the directive; (2) OLC’s “form and legality” 
certification; and (3) a memo (typically prepared by the Staff Secretary or 
another White House official) summarizing the interagency consultation 
process and any remaining points of disagreement—with a focus on “high-
level objections” from Cabinet members or other top officials.136 The 
President then opts to sign (or not sign) the directive.137 
 
Kavanaugh’s Staff Secretary Work, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 27, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/4e272e40fe914e19a1d67212bae99056 [https://perma.cc/R42C-XX97]. 
132 See De Interview, supra note 9 (describing his work as Obama Staff Secretary); Presidential 
Departments, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/get-
involved/internships/presidential-departments [https://perma.cc/B48Y-HE6Y] (last visited Oct. 15, 
2019) (describing the Staff Secretary as “the gate-keeper of paper flowing into and out of the Oval 
Office”). 
133 See De Interview, supra note 9 (noting that most of the “vetting” for executive orders 
happens through the interagency consultation process headed by OMB but, as Staff Secretary, he 
would also “mak[e] sure relevant constituencies in the White House” were “on board”); see also Bies 
Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how “OMB runs the agency clearance” process, while the “Staff 
Secretary runs White House clearance”). 
134 See De Interview, supra note 9. 
135 E.g., id. (reporting that the comments ranged from “thoughtful things” to “nonsense”); 
Egan Interview, supra note 9 (describing some comments as “crazy,” some “not-so-crazy”). 
136 See De Interview, supra note 9; Gray Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that the President 
received the summary memo and “of course” would get the text “because that is what the [President] 
signs”); Egan Interview, supra note 9 (relating how the President receives the text of the order along 
with an “action memorandum” that describes only “high-level objections”). 
137 Former officials told me that the President typically signs the directive, although there are 
occasions when he will “kick it back.” Gray Interview, supra note 9; see also Egan Interview, supra 
note 9. The text of the executive order or proclamation is then published in the Federal Register. 
Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 3, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5848 (June 19, 1962); see also 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) 
(2018) (requiring proclamations and executive orders with “general applicability and legal effect” to 
be published in the Federal Register). 
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b. Examples 
A scuffle within the Carter Administration illustrates the negotiation 
process among agencies. As political scientist Kenneth Mayer recounts, there 
was a dispute among federal agencies over a draft executive order that would 
implement the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).138 The main 
issue was whether (and the extent to which) the order should direct federal 
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for actions in foreign 
countries.139 Although the Council on Environmental Quality pushed for a 
broad order, a string of federal agencies—including the State Department, 
the Defense Department, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—insisted 
that NEPA should be limited to domestic conduct.140 
Given the importance of the issue, President Carter weighed in during the 
agency review. Although Carter reportedly favored a broad interpretation of 
NEPA,141 that is not the position he took. Instead, as Mayer explains, Carter 
opted to “split[] the difference” among the agencies.142 The resulting 
directive—Executive Order 12,114—required environmental impact statements 
for some foreign actions but contained a number of restrictions and 
exemptions; for example, nuclear facilities were exempted, as the State 
Department had requested.143 
Accordingly, President Carter made the ultimate decision to issue the 
directive. But the content was not his first-best policy choice. Nor was this 
an exceptional case. As Rudalevige recounts (based on detailed archival 
research of executive orders from the Truman through the Reagan 
Administrations, as well as data from the Clinton Administration), 
Presidents have often issued compromise orders, accommodating the 
competing recommendations of agencies.144 
Indeed, this interagency consultation process may even lead the President 
to issue a largely toothless order. An episode from the Clinton 
 
138 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2018) (enacting the National Environmental Policy Act); 
MAYER, supra note 11, at 61-65. 
139 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 61-65 (describing “a protracted wrangle between the foreign 
affairs/defense and environmental agencies about the foreign application of ” NEPA). 
140 See id. at 62 (the concern was that “applying NEPA abroad would undercut foreign policy 
objectives . . . and interfere with foreign trade and economic development programs”). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 63-64 (“Carter himself resolved the outstanding issues . . . more or less splitting the 
difference between the agencies”). 
143 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 9, 1979); MAYER, supra note 11, at 64 (noting 
the order’s requirements were far less than NEPA demanded of domestic conduct). 
144 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 142-44, 150-51 (discussing the history of executive order 
negotiations within the executive branch); see also MAYER, supra note 11, at 65 (“The story of 
Executive Order 12114 is hardly exceptional . . . .”). 
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Administration illustrates this point. A proposed executive order would have 
required federal agencies to evaluate the effect of agency action on children’s 
environmental health—and, to the extent an agency “failed to protect 
children fully,” to explain and justify that failure.145 Although one might think 
that children’s health would be an uncontroversial topic, the directive went 
through months of negotiations.146 As Rudalevige describes, some agencies 
worried that the order would open them up to lawsuits; the Department of 
Health and Human Services wondered how it could legitimately say that 
“tobacco remained a legal product,” given that “[b]anning it would clearly be 
better for children’s health.”147 Even after White House officials had 
substantially softened the language of the order, President Clinton himself 
weighed in, suggesting that he “might want to ease [the] burden a bit” 
more.148 The final order did instruct agencies to pay attention to children’s 
environmental health, but only “to the extent permitted by law” and only as 
“appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission.”149 
Finally, the interagency consultation process may block new directives 
entirely—even those strongly favored by the President. This point is 
underscored by a lengthy debate over Lyndon Johnson’s Executive Order 
11,246, which not only prohibits government contractors from discriminating 
on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national origin” but also requires them 
to engage in “affirmative action.”150 When affirmative action became a more 
controversial topic in the 1980s and 1990s, so did Executive Order 11,246. The 
order was a thorn in the side of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
 
145 Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 142-43. 
146 See id. at 142-44 (recounting the four-month-long debate over the proposed order). 
147 Id. at 144. 
148 Id. (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “[e]ven as the president was urged to issue 
the order, several departments continued to press their reservations” and “President Clinton 
requested still more changes.” Id. 
149 See Exec. Order 13,045, § 1, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885, 19,885 (April 21, 1997) (“[T]o the extent 
permitted by law and appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission, each Federal agency: 
(a) shall make it a high priority to identify and assess environmental health risks . . . that may 
disproportionately affect children; and (b) shall ensure that its” actions address those risks). 
150 Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,320 (Sept. 24, 1965). Interestingly, 
language barring discrimination on the basis of “sex” came from Executive Order 11,375, which 
President Lyndon Johnson issued a few years later. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303, 
14,304 (Oct. 13, 1967). Yet courts and commentators commonly refer to the sum total of the orders 
as “Executive Order 11,246.” See, e.g., Contractors Assoc. of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 
163 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that the prohibition of sex discrimination “comes from Exec. Order 
No. 11375, . . . and represents a minor change from the original” order) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Duquesne Light Comp., 423 F. Supp. 507, 508-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (discussing only 
Executive Order 11,246 in a suit alleging “discriminat[ion] against blacks and women”). 
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Administrations, and both attempted to issue a new order to revoke it.151 
Notably, presidential directives remain in force until they are revised or 
revoked.152 And executive officials assume that any new directive—even one 
modifying a prior directive—should go through the same basic process.153 
This process did not go smoothly for Presidents Reagan or Bush. Although 
the Department of Justice strongly pushed for revocation of Executive Order 
11,246, the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and the Department of 
Labor adamantly fought to retain the executive order.154 Moreover, Mayer 
reports that the Labor Department’s “congressional allies” heard about the 
planned revocation (as did some civil rights groups), and they pressured each 
administration to stay the course.155 Ultimately, both Presidents Reagan and 
Bush backed down and left Executive Order 11,246 in place.156 
2. Other Directives 
Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030 applies only to directives labeled as 
“executive orders” or “proclamations.”157 Since at least the George H.W. Bush 
Administration, Presidents have also relied on presidential “memoranda,” 
which are in substance identical to executive orders.158 Moreover, since the 
mid-twentieth century, Presidents have issued national security directives 
under various labels—for example, “policy papers,” “presidential policy 
directives,” or simply “directives.”159 There is no official process for crafting 
 
151 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 206-10 (describing these efforts and noting “[b]y the 1980s 
affirmative action” was “anathema to the Reagan administration”). 
152 See COOPER, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that “executive orders and other 
pronouncements . . . remain in effect” until “they are amended, superseded, or rescinded”). 
153 See De Interview, supra note 9 (relating that the same basic process was used for substantive 
revisions); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the process was and should be “the same”). 
154 MAYER, supra note 11, at 206-08; RICARDO JOSÉ PEREIRA RODRIGUES, THE 
PREEMINENCE OF POLITICS: EXECUTIVE ORDERS FROM EISENHOWER TO CLINTON 82-83 
(2007). Notably, the Labor Department enforces Executive Order 11,246. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 
§201, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
155 MAYER, supra note 11, at 207-08. 
156 See id. at 209-10, 213 (“Executive Order 11246 ha[s] proved amazingly durable.”). After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (which involved separate 
requirements for government contractors), the Clinton Administration made changes to Executive 
Order 11,246. See 515 U.S. 200, 206-10, 235-39 (1995) (holding that all governmental racial 
classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny); MAYER, supra note 11, at 210-12 (reporting that “the 
changes were confined to contracting set-asides, not to the affirmative action employment practices 
required of government contractors”). 
157 Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5847 (June 19, 1962). 
158 See COOPER, supra note 21, at 16 (describing how memoranda are “sometimes us[ed] 
. . . interchangeably with executive orders”). 
159 Id. at 207-09. My research suggests that courts rarely weigh in on the meaning of national 
security directives. That is perhaps not surprising, given that many are classified. See id. at 209 (“The 
vast majority of these [national security] directives are classified . . . .”). 
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these directives. Yet my interviews indicate that these directives also go 
through agency review.160 As one former Staff Secretary explained, there is 
no “formalistic distinction” among documents; “a great deal of care” generally 
goes into any “product that the President is going to sign.”161 
The main differences are that OMB does not oversee the creation of 
memoranda or national security directives, and OLC does not necessarily 
review the documents for “form and legality.”162 Instead, the White House 
Counsel’s office (or another entity in the Executive Office of the President) 
generally oversees the process.163 But the process otherwise appears to be 
quite similar. The relevant entity in the White House sends the draft (which, 
again, is often written by agency officials) to interested agencies, gets 
feedback on both law and policy, redrafts, and then sends it out again, perhaps 
multiple times.164 As with executive orders and proclamations, the President 
may be consulted to the extent there are disputes about important 
directives.165 The document then goes to the Staff Secretary, who may invite 
additional comments.166 
The Staff Secretary sends the text of the resulting directive to the 
President, along with a memo summarizing the interagency consultation 
process (again, with a focus on “high-level” issues).167 Thus, the President 
does not hear about every single agency comment, but former officials stated 
that it would be “very bad form” not to advise the President about major 
disagreements from Cabinet or other top officials.168 The President then 
decides whether to sign the resulting document.169 
 
160 See infra notes 162–168 and accompanying text. 
161 De Interview, supra note 9. 
162 See Bies Interview, supra note 9; Egan Interview, supra note 9. 
163 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how “by tradition,” the process is run by “the 
part of the [White House] responsible for that policy” and that entity endeavors to make sure the 
issues are “fully developed” and “thoroughly reviewed” by relevant agencies). 
164 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (describing how agencies “with expertise are consulted” 
and they “likely” helped “draft [the directive] in the first instance”); Gray Interview, supra note 9 
(explaining that regardless of the document’s label, “the proposed document would be circulated for 
comment”). 
165 See Gray Interview, supra note 9 (discussing how the President might be consulted and then 
he “would make a decision on contested points 1, 2, 3”). 
166 See De Interview, supra note 9. 
167 The President receives the text of the directive along with an “action memorandum” that 
describes only “high-level objections.” Egan Interview, supra note 9. See also De Interview, supra note 
9 (explaining that the “package to the President” includes the text and the summary memo). 
168 Egan Interview, supra note 9; see also Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that a “good 
staffer” must inform the President about any major disagreements among agencies). 
169 If the President signs the directive, he may—and often does—publish the resulting 
document in the Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2018) (providing that presidential 
proclamations, orders, and other documents the President determines to have “general applicability 
and legal effect” shall be published in the Federal Register). 
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3. Deviations 
There is another factor that further diminishes the distinction among 
directives: whether a directive is styled as an “executive order,” 
“proclamation,” “memorandum,” or something else entirely, executive actors 
feel free to use a different process.170 In other words, Presidents do not 
consistently follow Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030. 
In this way, Presidents take full advantage of the flexibility offered by the 
Opinions Clause. That provision gives the President the discretion to seek 
out as much, or as little, counsel as he deems necessary.171 And as several 
former officials (from both Democratic and Republican administrations) 
explained, there are reasons why the President may seek advice on certain 
directives from a smaller group. Some executive orders are “politically 
sensitive.”172 If such draft orders are broadly distributed to agency officials 
(through the usual OMB process), the existence of that draft may be leaked 
before it has been fully vetted.173 Accordingly, the White House Counsel’s 
Office may oversee the agency review itself (or ask OMB to use a different 
process), sending the draft order only to high-level agency officials who will 
be more cautious about sharing the information.174 Some orders may even 
skip OLC “form and legality” review.175 Accordingly, regardless of the label, 
a President may opt for a modified process. 
 
170 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 60-61 (“There is no penalty for avoiding” Kennedy’s Executive 
Order 11,030, and thus “when the White House is under time pressure it routinely bypasses the 
formal routine.”). As one interviewee explained, there was no “formalistic” divide between an 
“executive order,” “proclamation,” or other document, and no particular “machinery” for any given 
directive. De Interview, supra note 9. The White House might use a formal process for a 
memorandum or a truncated process for an executive order. Id. 
171 The Opinions Clause, as interpreted in this Article, both explains and justifies presidential 
departures from Executive Order 11,030. Because the Opinions Clause gives the President the 
discretion to seek as much or as little advice from his subordinates as he sees fit, Executive Order 
11,030 can only provide guidelines, rather than binding rules. 
172 De Interview, supra note 9 (explaining that the White House might use a different process 
for a “sensitive” executive order); Luttig Interview, supra note 9 (noting that “[i]f you’ve got 
something politically sensitive, politically focused,” then you would not follow the regular process); 
see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (stating that such departures were “rare” during the George 
H.W. Bush Administration). 
173 See De Interview, supra note 9 (describing the Office of Management and Budget as akin 
to a “machine” that has a formal process in place for executive orders, but that a very well-meaning 
career person might share a “sensitive” draft order too broadly). 
174 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (agreeing that an executive order might bypass the typical 
process if it is “sensitive” and noting that OMB itself has ways to “expedite” the process, at least in 
the national security realm). 
175 Political scientist Kenneth Mayer reports that the “most commonly skipped step” is OLC 
“form and legality” review. MAYER, supra note 11, at 60-61. According to Mayer, in such cases, OMB 
staff “rely[] on informal legal guidance as a substitute.” Id. 
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Nevertheless, officials repeatedly reaffirmed that virtually all directives go 
through some type of agency review. Moreover, for any directive, the process 
can be tedious. Although it is easier to issue a presidential directive than to 
enact legislation, the process takes a good deal longer than one might 
expect—anywhere from several weeks to several months (or even years).176 
Indeed, one former official remarked that “newbies” in his office would 
complain that it could “take forever” to issue a presidential directive.177 
III. THE CASE FOR TEXTUALISM 
The Opinions Clause of Article II invites the President to seek out advice 
from his subordinates in order to make a more informed decision. I argue 
that Presidents have exercised that power in structuring the interagency 
consultation process for presidential directives. Many directives go through 
weeks or even months of negotiation; after that process, the President may 
well decide to issue a compromise or toothless directive—or perhaps no 
directive at all. Through this process, Presidents have (perhaps surprisingly) 
exercised the power to tie their own hands—and accept the recommendations 
of their subordinates. 
Although Article II does not require the President to engage in such 
consultation, the existence of this process has important implications for 
interpreting presidential directives. A court should not assume that any 
directive perfectly implements its apparent purposes; nor should a court 
assume that the directive reflects the President’s preferred substantive policy. 
Any presidential directive may reflect the President’s own decision to balance 
competing interests. Alternatively, and particularly when the President opts 
for a truncated process, he may well issue a directive that, in hindsight, 
appears to be ill-considered. The Constitution gives him the power to make—
and holds him accountable for—those ill-informed decisions as well. Federal 
courts, I argue, can best give effect to these presidential decisions by adhering 
to the text of a directive. 
A. Preliminary Questions: Author’s Intent or Purpose? 
Once we turn our focus to Article II, a natural assumption might be that 
interpreters should focus on the intent of the President. After all, in sharp 
 
176 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (“[S]ometimes these documents are argued over in the 
executive branch for weeks or months . . . .”); MAYER, supra note 11, at 61 (“Simple executive orders 
navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over 
the inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.”). 
177 Egan Interview, supra note 9 (describing how some officials viewed the process as 
“inefficient or bureaucratic”). 
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contrast to statutes enacted under Article I (which must receive the assent of 
the multi-member Congress and the President), presidential directives seem 
to have a unitary author. For similar reasons, one might assume that any 
public statements made by the President should inform the meaning of 
presidential directives.178 
These assumptions are very reasonable—until one learns about the 
complex process that Presidents have crafted for issuing presidential 
directives. As discussed, interpretive theorists assume that the process for 
creating a document should inform interpretive theory, and Presidents use a 
distinct process to create presidential laws. 
Presidents, of course, say a lot of things—in the State of the Union 
Address, other speeches, interviews, press conferences, and even on 
Twitter.179 But not every presidential declaration becomes a presidential law. 
Instead, that designation is limited to a subset of presidential issuances—
those labeled “executive orders,” “proclamations,” “memoranda” and the 
like—that aim to direct the actions of subordinate officials.180 This 
 
178 To be clear, this Article focuses on the meaning, not the validity, of presidential directives. 
For arguments that public statements by the President should be relevant to an analysis of 
constitutionally impermissible motive, see Shaw, supra note 4 at 1372-74, 1386-97; see also Aziz Z. 
Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1273 (2018) (arguing for 
consideration of campaign statements to assess presidential intent). This Article thus does not 
address whether the Supreme Court should have considered President Trump’s public statements in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the third version of the travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. 
Ct. 2392, 2416-23 (2018) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the ban despite “statements 
by the President . . . casting doubt on the official[ly]” stated purpose of the ban). For an insightful 
analysis of constitutionally impermissible motive in the legislative context, see generally Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). For a deep 
historical look at judicial examination of legislative purpose, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of 
Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1795-1859 (2008).  
179 For a recent overview of presidential speech, see generally Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully 
Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017). 
180 Since 1935, these directives (regardless of the label) have generally been published in the 
Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2018); see also supra notes 24–25, 35–43 (citing presidential 
directives). To distinguish presidential laws from other presidential speech, courts could use 
publication in the Federal Register as a “rule of recognition.” 
This Article brackets that issue, in large part because there seems to be widespread agreement 
as to what constitutes a presidential law as opposed to other speech. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 4, 
at 93 (differentiating “presidential speech” from “presidential action” like executive orders, 
presidential memoranda, proclamations, and executive agreements). This well-established 
distinction between presidential “speech” and “action” is illustrated by the recent controversy 
surrounding transgender individuals in the military. In a series of tweets, President Trump 
declared that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to 
serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER 
(July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864 
[https://perma.cc/3GKL-J2DT]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 
2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472 
[https://perma.cc/Y4CE-NRES]. But the Department of Defense took no action until the 
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designation as a presidential law is important, because such laws bind not only 
lower-level officials but also future presidential administrations. As my 
interviews underscored, executive officials assume that a presidential 
directive governs all successive administrations until the directive is formally 
revised or revoked.181 Other presidential speeches do not have the same 
binding force across administrations. 
For these presidential laws, Presidents rely on a complex process 
through which agency officials draft, revise, and redraft directives. At the 
end of this process, a President may opt to sign a directive that does not 
reflect his preferred substantive policy (“purpose”) or wishes (“intent”).182 
Relatedly, as discussed further below, the resulting directive may be in 
considerable tension with the President’s other public statements.183 The 
President may opt for compromise in the directive, taking into account the 
competing wishes of agency officials. 
The process for crafting presidential directives thus offers an important 
illustration of what Daphna Renan calls the President’s “two bodies”: the 
often uncertain “relationship between the person of the president and 
the	. . . institution of the presidency.”184 In this context, individual Presidents 
have chosen to rely largely on the institution of the presidency to determine 
 
President followed up with a formal memorandum. See Memorandum on Military Service by 
Transgender Individuals, § 1(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 41,319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (directing relevant officials 
to terminate the official policy allowing “military service by transgender individuals”); Bryan 
Bender & Jacqueline Klimas, Pentagon Takes No Steps to Enforce Trump’s Transgender Ban, 
POLITICO (June 27, 2017, 11:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/trump-
transgender-military-ban-no-modification-241029 [https://perma.cc/UK58-NC2C] (explaining 
that the Department of Defense did not treat the initial tweets as a binding directive). Even if 
executive officials in the Trump Administration had treated the tweets as a presidential directive, 
it is highly unlikely that any subsequent administration would have done so. By contrast, a 
subsequent administration will treat a presidential memorandum as a directive that remains in 
force until it is revoked. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
181 Notably, every official I interviewed treated the binding nature of directives as a given. See 
supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. This accords with both official declarations of the 
executive branch and political science research. See, e.g., O.L.C., Legal Effectiveness, supra note 23, 
at 29-30 (“[A] presidential directive . . . would remain in force, unless otherwise specified, pending 
any future presidential action.”); COOPER, supra note 21, at 2 (“[E]xecutive orders and other 
pronouncements . . . remain in effect unless and until they are amended, superseded, or rescinded.”). 
182 To be sure, “intent” is a challenging concept, one that is not always clearly defined or 
distinguished from “purpose.” But one can think of “intent” as a wish for how a law will be applied 
in a particular case, while “purpose” is “the general aim or policy which pervades a [law] but has yet 
to find specific application.” Manning, supra note 70, at 1291 n.22 (quoting Archibald Cox, Judge 
Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370-71 (1947)). 
183 See infra subsection III.B.2.b; Section III.C. 
184 Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 1), https://ssrn/com/abstract=3505345 (emphasis added). 
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the contours of presidential directives. That is, individual Presidents have 
ceded considerable power to the broader administrative apparatus. 
Part IV explores some reasons why Presidents may choose to tie their own 
hands through the interagency consultation process. But for now, it is important 
to understand that presidential directives often do not reflect the author’s intent 
or perfectly carry out a single purpose. It turns out that “unilateral” presidential 
directives are less unilateral than one might have presumed. 
B. Consultation and Presidential Decisionmaking 
Presidential directives are often the product of a compromise among 
agencies. I argue here that a focus on the text will enable courts to best capture 
those presidential decisions. But I first examine the less common (but still 
important) scenario: when the President bypasses most of the established 
process. Article II, I suggest, has lessons for that scenario as well. 
1. Lack of Consultation and Accountability 
In January 2017, President Trump issued his first travel ban, which 
suspended the entry of individuals from seven predominantly Muslim 
countries.185 Although we still do not know the details of the process leading 
up to that directive, there seems to be widespread agreement that it bypassed 
virtually all agency review.186 Notably, that was true, even though the 
directive was styled as an “executive order.” 
In the litigation over that first travel ban, one central issue was whether 
the White House Counsel could (after the fact) issue a memorandum 
 
185 See Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978 (suspending entry from countries 
referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“[S]ection 3(c) of the Executive Order suspends for 90 days the entry of aliens from seven 
countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.”). 
186 See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of the Trump Executive 
Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 11:29 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/QE55-52Q2] (reporting that the White House contended that “OLC signed off 
and agency review was performed,” but “[a] source said the creation of the executive order did not 
follow the standard agency review process”); Kim Soffen & Darla Cameron, How Trump’s Travel 
Ban Broke from the Normal Executive Order Process, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-travel-ban-process/ 
[https://perma.cc/L2JG-SJ2J] (reporting that the order was reviewed by the OLC, but that it 
skipped most, if not all, of the consultation process). Some federal courts accepted the reports that 
the first travel ban bypassed most review. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. 
Supp. 3d 539, 545 (D. Md.) (“The drafting process . . . did not involve traditional interagency review 
. . . . [T]here was no consultation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Justice, or the Department of Homeland Security.”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 857 
F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). 
914 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 877 
 
narrowing the scope of the Executive Order.187 The issue arose out of 
confusion over whether the ban applied to lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs).188 The text was certainly broad enough to encompass such 
individuals. The President “proclaim[ed] that the immigrant and 
nonimmigrant entry . . . of aliens from [the seven] countries . . . would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States” and thus “suspend[ed] 
entry . . . of such persons for 90 days.”189 Moreover, the Executive Order 
expressly “exclude[d]” certain visa holders from the travel ban, including 
“foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas.”190 LPRs were notably 
absent from the list of exceptions. But soon after the Executive Order was 
challenged in court, the White House Counsel issued a memorandum 
“clarify[ing]” that the ban did not “apply to lawful permanent residents.”191 
Federal courts disagreed sharply over whether they should accept the 
“clarification” offered by the White House Counsel.192 The lessons of the 
constitutional structure strongly suggest that the answer should be no.193 
The Opinions Clause of Article II permits, but does not require, the 
President to seek advice from subordinates. Accordingly, the President had 
the constitutional power to forgo agency review. But another lesson of the 
Opinions Clause is that the President must be accountable for the resulting 
(perhaps ill-informed) decision. Our Constitution created no council of 
 
187 See, e.g., Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32-33 (D. Mass. 2017). 
188 Id. 
189 Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978. 
190 Id. 
191 Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to the Acting Sec’y 
of State, the Acting Att’y Gen., & Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://case.edu/executive-
order-updates/docs/f.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4GQ-HPCK]. 
192 Compare Louhghalam, 230 F. Supp. at 32-33 (concluding, based in part on the White House 
Counsel’s memorandum, that the executive order did not apply to lawful permanent residents, and 
thus the claims as to those plaintiffs were moot), with Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165-66 
(9th Cir. 2017) (declining to credit the memorandum in considering mootness of claims) and Aziz 
v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d. 724, 727-28 (E.D. Va. 2017) (same). 
193 Under the Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950, the President may delegate certain 
functions, such as clarifying a directive, to subordinates via directive. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018). But that 
statute did not apply here for two reasons. First, the statute permits delegation only to an official 
subject to Senate confirmation. Id. The White House Counsel does not undergo a Senate vote. See 
Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63-64 (1993) (observing that although “[t]he Attorney General 
(along with other top officers in the Justice Department) must be confirmed by the Senate,” the 
White House Counsel and his aides “are appointed at the sole discretion of the president”). Second, 
any such delegation must be in the text of the directive or otherwise published in the Federal 
Register. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (“Such designation and authorization shall be in writing [and] 
shall be published in the Federal Register . . . .”). President Trump’s order said nothing about a 
delegation to the White House Counsel. Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978. 
Notably, such issues of presidential delegation present many challenging questions that are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
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advisors with veto power over presidential decisions—and thus no council for 
the President to blame if things went wrong.194 A logical corollary of that 
structural principle would be that the President’s subordinates also cannot fix 
any presidential errors after the fact. The Opinions Clause “concentrate[s] 
accountability for presidential action on the president himself.”195 
2. Consultation, Compromise, and Even Toothless Directives 
As commentators suggested at the time of the first travel ban, and as my 
own research confirmed, most directives go through a far more searching 
review. This process has important implications for interpretive method. At 
the end of the interagency consultation process, Presidents may opt to issue 
compromise or even watered-down directives. I argue that federal courts 
should respect the President’s decision to accept half a loaf. And courts can 
best respect that decision by adhering to the text. 
a. Compromise Directives 
As we have seen, when agencies in the Carter Administration were 
divided over a draft executive order, the President “split[] the difference” 
among the agencies and issued an order that did not reflect his preferred 
substantive policy.196 Along the same lines, a President may opt to issue a 
directive that does not perfectly implement its apparent purposes. For that 
reason, I argue that courts should adhere to the limitations in the text, rather 
than attempt to carry out the apparent purpose of a directive. 
A dispute over an executive order issued by President Clinton under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) helps to illustrate 
this point.197 The IEEPA permits the President to block financial 
transactions involving a country that presents a national security threat.198 
 
194 See supra Section II.A. 
195 AMAR, supra note 94, at 326. 
196 MAYER, supra note 11, at 63-64; see supra subsection II.B.1.b. 
197 See infra notes 198–212 and accompanying text. 
198 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (2018). IEEPA executive orders have led to assorted litigation. 
See Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave., 830 F.3d 107, 117, 124-25, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (addressing the 
definition of “Iran” in Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)); United States 
v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576, 579, 581-83 (4th Cir. 2001) (determining that goods “of Iranian 
origin” encompass Persian rugs under Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29, 
1987)); United States v. Elashi, 440 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541-43, 568-69 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding 
that the defendant’s property fell within the ban in Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 
(Jan. 23, 1995)). 
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Any person who violates such an executive order may be subject to civil or 
criminal penalties.199 
Mohammad Reza Ehsan was criminally prosecuted for violating Clinton’s 
Executive Order 12,959, which prohibited the “export[]” of goods to Iran.200 
Ehsan had ordered the shipment of a product from the United States to 
Dubai, apparently planning to send it later to Iran.201 Ehsan argued, however, 
that this shipment was “not an impermissible ‘export’” (from the United 
States to Iran) but a permissible “export” (from the United States to Dubai) 
and “reexport” (from Dubai to Iran).202 
There was considerable support for Ehsan’s interpretation in the text of 
the order. Executive Order 12,959 broadly barred “the exportation from the 
United States to Iran . . . of any goods, technology . . . or services.”203 But the 
order prohibited “the reexportation to Iran” only of “any goods or 
technology” subject to certain licensing requirements.204 All parties agreed 
that Ehsan’s product was not subject to those licensing rules.205 Moreover, the 
term “export” is often used to refer to the movement of goods from the 
United States to a foreign country, while “reexport” refers to the shipment of 
goods from a foreign country to another foreign country.206 
Executive Order 12,959 appeared to reflect a compromise. The primary 
focus was, of course, ensuring that products were not sent directly from the 
 
199 See 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2018) (making it “unlawful” to violate any order issued pursuant to 
the IEEPA, with penalties including imprisonment up to twenty years). 
200 U.S. v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 856 (4th Cir. 1998). 
201 Id. at 857. Ehsan was not a sympathetic defendant. He had attempted to order the product 
(Transformer Oil Gas Analysis Systems) from a U.S. company for direct shipment to Iran. Id. The 
U.S. company declined, because of the export ban. Id. So then Ehsan ordered that the product be 
shipped to Dubai, with plans to send it to Iran. Id. U.S. customs agents learned about the deal, and 
Ehsan was arrested by federal agents. Id. 
202 Id. at 859; see also id. (“Ehsan insists that the government may not prosecute him for an 
export to Iran when he reasonably could have thought he was engaged in reexportation.”). 
203 Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995); see also id. 
(prohibiting “the exportation from the United States to Iran . . . of any goods, technology (including 
technical data . . . subject to the Export Administration Regulations . . . ), or services”). 
204 Id. § 1(c), at 24,757; see id. (prohibiting “the reexportation to Iran . . . of any goods or 
technology (including technical data or other information) exported from the United States, the 
exportation of which to Iran is subject to [certain] export license application requirements”). 
205 See Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 857 n.1 (agreeing that Ehsan’s product was “exempt from the 
reexportation ban”). 
206 That is true, for example, of the Department of Commerce’s Export Administrative 
Regulations (EAR), which were issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979. See 15 
C.F.R § 734.13(a)(1) (2020) (defining “export” as “[a]n actual shipment or transmission out of the 
United States”); 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(3) (defining “reexport” as “[a]n actual shipment or 
transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country”). 
Notably, Clinton’s order expressly referred to those regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b), 
60 Fed. Reg. at 24,757. 
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United States to a country the President viewed as an international sponsor 
of terrorism.207 But “reexportation” is a potentially trickier issue, because it 
involves the passage of goods between two foreign countries.208 After 
consultation with interested agencies (which would almost certainly have 
included the State Department, Treasury Department, and National Security 
Agency),209 the President might reasonably have opted to bar “reexportation” 
in more limited circumstances. Accordingly, Ehsan had a strong argument 
that he could export goods (from the United States to Dubai), and then 
reexport them (from Dubai to Iran) without running afoul of the order. 
The Ehsan court did not consider that possibility. Instead, the court 
interpreted the Executive Order in accordance with what the court found to 
be its “obvious purpose.”210 “[T]he Executive Order intended to cut off the 
shipment of goods intended for Iran.”211 Because Ehsan’s goal was to “seek a 
market in Iran,” his shipment constituted an “exportation” to Iran.212 That is, 
the court interpreted the Executive Order so as to most effectively carry out 
its apparent purpose. But once we recognize that Presidents often issue 
compromise orders, courts have good reason to hew closely to the limitations 
embodied in the text. 
In sum, I argue that courts should respect the President’s power to issue 
a less-than-effective order—and let the President correct any “mistakes” 
himself. As it turns out, President Clinton did later revise the executive order 
at issue in Ehsan to broaden the ban on reexportations.213 I return to the 
importance of revised directives below. 
 
207 Cf. Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 859 (finding that the President sought in part to “sanction[] Iran’s 
sponsorship of international terrorism”). 
208 See supra note 206 (citing sources defining “reexportation” as the movement of goods from 
one foreign country to another foreign country). 
209 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (noting the agencies consulted on national security 
issues). Today, the list would also include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but DHS 
did not exist in 1995. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(creating DHS). 
210 Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 859. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 857-59. The court asserted that its interpretation was consistent with the text of the 
directive. Throughout history, the court stated, “‘exportation’ has consistently meant the shipment 
of goods to a foreign country with the intent to join those goods with the commerce of that country.” 
Id. at 858. Under this view, the Executive Order barred the “exportation” of any goods headed 
(ultimately) for Iran. Id. at 859. But throughout this analysis, the court failed to explain how this 
definition might differentiate an “export” from a “reexport” to Iran. 
213 The subsequent order would clearly have covered Ehsan’s conduct. See Exec. Order No. 
13,059, § 2, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531, 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997) (prohibiting “the exportation, 
reexportation	. . . directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person . . . of 
any goods . . . to Iran . . ., including the exportation, reexportation . . . undertaken with knowledge 
or reason to know . . . such goods . . . are intended” for Iran). 
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b. Toothless Directives 
Presidents may also opt, after consultation, to issue directives that do very 
little at all. Clinton’s executive order on children’s environmental health 
illustrates this point. After agencies repeatedly expressed concerns about 
lawsuits, and the extent to which the new directive might be in tension with 
other commitments (like the legality of tobacco), Clinton decided to “ease 
[the] burden a bit” and issued a watered-down directive.214 The ultimate order 
instructed agencies to act only “to the extent permitted by law” and only as 
“appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission . . . .”215 
Some readers might think that Presidents always hedge their bets in 
directives in order to stave off legal challenge, and thus always include qualifiers 
like “to the extent permitted by law.” But that is not the case. For example, the 
executive order in Ehsan (Clinton’s Executive Order 12,959) “prohibited . . . the 
exportation” of certain products “from the United States to Iran,” without such 
qualifiers.216 Likewise, President Trump’s second and third travel bans—which, 
by all accounts, were subject to a more extensive consultation process than the 
first217—“suspended” the entry of designated individuals.218 There was no 
qualifying language attached to those suspensions.219 
This analysis has important implications for recent litigation over 
President Trump’s executive order on funding for sanctuary cities. One of the 
 
214 Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 144; see supra subsection II.B.1.b. 
215 Exec. Order 13,045, § 1, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885, 19,885 (April 21, 1997). 
216 Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995). There were 
likewise no such qualifiers in the revised directive. See Exec. Order No. 13,059, § 2(a) 62 Fed. Reg. 
44,531, 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997). 
217 See Steve Holland & Julia Edwards Ainsley, Trump Signs Revised Travel Ban in Bid to 
Overcome Legal Challenges, REUTERS (March 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-exclusive/trump-signs-revised-travel-ban-in-bid-to-overcome-legal-challenges-
idUSKBN16D154 [https://perma.cc/588H-YD24] (reporting that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis 
and other senior cabinet members provided input on the revised travel ban); see also W. Neil 
Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the Breakdown of Intra-Executive 
Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825, 839 (2018) (“By all accounts, EO-3 appears to have gone 
through at least some review . . . .”). 
218 See Travel Ban Version Two, supra note 24, §2(c), at 13213 (suspending entry subject only to 
specified limitations, waivers, and exceptions); see Travel Ban Version Three, supra note 25 §2, at 
45165-67 (“The entry . . . of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, 
as follows, subject to categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers . . . .”). 
219 Notably, other provisions of the second travel ban contained the “to the extent permitted by 
law” qualifier. But the “suspension of entry” provision did not. See Travel Ban Version Two, supra 
note 24, §6(d), at 13216 (“It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law 
and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of ” refugee 
resettlement (emphasis added)); id. § 9(b), at 13217 (“To the extent permitted by law and subject to the 
availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows 
Program . . . .” (emphasis added)). The third travel ban contained no such qualifier in any section. 
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central questions is whether the order does anything at all.220 Executive Order 
13,768 provides: 
[T]he Attorney General and the Secretary [of DHS], in their discretion and to 
the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse 
to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to 
receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement 
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.221 
The order further states that “[t]he Secretary has the authority to designate, 
in his discretion and to the extent consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary 
jurisdiction.”222 
Notably, this question of meaning is preliminary to the challenging 
constitutional questions in the case. As the plaintiff localities have argued, if 
Executive Order 13,768 requires the Attorney General and DHS Secretary to 
strip federal grants from localities, the President has arguably usurped 
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, thereby transgressing the 
constitutional separation of powers, and commandeered localities in violation 
of the federalism principles underlying the Tenth Amendment.223 
 
220 Another issue was whether the Attorney General could “clarify” the order via 
memorandum. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to All Department Grant-Making 
Components 1 (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/download 
[https://perma.cc/M7MU-5N9P] (stating that Executive Order 13,768 only applies to “federal 
grants administered by the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security, and 
not to other sources of federal funding”). For reasons discussed in connection with the first travel 
ban, I do not believe that the Attorney General could contradict the plain text of the order. See 
supra subsection III.B.1. Although the President can delegate some functions to high-level 
officials by directive, the government has not suggested that the Attorney General sought to 
exercise any such delegated power. See supra note 193. The more challenging question in these 
cases is what the text means. 
221 Exec. Order No. 13,768, § 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Sanctuary City Order]; see also id. at §2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799 (“It is the policy of the 
executive branch to . . . [e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do 
not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.”) (emphasis added). Under the statute, state 
and local government entities may not prohibit their officials from sharing with federal officials 
“information regarding the . . . immigration status” of an individual. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018). 
Notably, a federal court recently found the statute itself unconstitutional. See City of Philadelphia 
v. Sessions, 309 F.Supp.3d 289, 329-31, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding § 1373(a) and (b) 
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it “unequivocally dictates what a state 
legislature may and may not do”) (internal quotations omitted), aff ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
on other grounds City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019). 
222 Sanctuary City Order, supra note 220, § 9(a), at 8801 (emphasis added). 
223 See City and Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(concluding that the order violated separation of powers principles); Cty. of Santa Clara v. 
Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507, 530-36 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding separation of powers, 
federalism, and due process violations). 
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That may be precisely why the Executive Order is couched in qualifiers. 
As officials told me, during the interagency consultation process, agency 
officials will often point out if a proposed directive seems to violate a federal 
statute, regulation, or the U.S. Constitution. Likewise, OLC review is 
focused on such questions of legality.224 Of course, we do not know that the 
order went through much review; it was issued in the early days of the 
Administration. Nonetheless, even a brief review could have uncovered these 
troubling issues. 
In a recent opinion on Executive Order 13,768, a Ninth Circuit majority 
found it implausible that the President had issued a toothless directive. The 
court declared that any such interpretation “strains credulity.”225 After all, the 
court emphasized, “Section 9(a) orders ‘the Attorney General and the 
Secretary’ to ‘ensure that [sanctuary jurisdictions] . . . are not eligible to 
receive Federal grants . . . .”226 The court discounted the “as consistent with 
law” qualifiers.227 A narrow reading, the court emphasized, would be at odds 
with the “object and policy” of the order—as reflected in public statements 
by the Administration.228 “The President himself stated that he would use 
defunding as a ‘weapon’” against sanctuary cities, and the White House Press 
Secretary reiterated that “President Trump would ‘make sure that . . . 
counties and other institutions that remain sanctuary cities don’t get federal 
government funding . . . .’”229 
Dissenting, Judge Ferdinand Fernandez suggested that his colleagues had 
too quickly “shunt[ed] aside” the “consistent with law” phrases in the 
Executive Order.230 “[I]f there is ambiguity in certain parts of the Executive 
 
224 See supra Section II.B. 
225 S.F., 897 F.3d at 1238. 
226 Id. at 1239. The court emphasized that Executive Order 13,768 exempted funds “deemed 
necessary for law enforcement purposes” and concluded that the order must apply to—and 
require the Attorney General and DHS Secretary to take away—all other funds from designated 
“sanctuary cities.” Id. 
227 See id. at 1239-40 (concluding that “the Executive Order unambiguously commands action” 
and its “savings clause does not and cannot override its meaning”). 
228 See id. at 1242-43 (“If we look beyond the text of the Executive Order, the Administration’s 
position becomes considerably weaker.”). 
229 Id. at 1243; see also Daniel Simon and Jesse Marx, Trump: Feds May Defund Calif. Over 
Sanctuary-state Push, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/06/california-sanctuary-state-
trump/97567378/ [https://perma.cc/8U4N-KYXV] (reporting that the President stated: “Well, it’s a 
weapon. I don’t want to defund the state or a city.” but “[i]f they [are] going to have sanctuary cities, 
we may have to do that. Certainly, that would be a weapon.”). 
230 S.F., 897 F.3d at 1249-50 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); id. at 1249 (describing the qualifiers as 
“short but clear and extraordinarily important wording in the Executive Order”); see also id. at 1247-
48 (finding the localities’ claims to be unripe). 
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Order, it is not at all ambiguous in its use of the restrictive language.”231 Judge 
Fernandez insisted: “To brush those words aside as implausible, or 
boilerplate, or even as words that would render the Executive Order 
meaningless was just to say that the plain language of the Executive Order 
should be ignored in favor of comments made dehors.”232 
The litigation over Executive Order 13,768 illustrates the importance of 
considering presidential directives as a distinct area of interpretive inquiry. 
Although this Article does not aim to resolve all the issues in these cases, the 
analysis here should offer guidance on the question of meaning. First, once 
we consider the interagency consultation process, it becomes quite plausible 
that the President issued a directive that did not match his preferred 
substantive policy. Although the President may have wanted to “use 
defunding as a ‘weapon’” and hoped sanctuary cities would not “‘get federal 
government funding,’”233 the directive he issued is far more muted. The 
directive is couched in qualifiers, instructing the Attorney General and DHS 
Secretary to act only “to the extent consistent with law.”234 Moreover, not all 
presidential directives—including not all directives issued by the Trump 
Administration—contain similar qualifying language.235 That fact alone 
makes the “consistent with law” language in Executive Order 13,768 seem 
more significant.236 
Finally, it is quite plausible that the President issued a largely toothless 
directive. During the interagency consultation process, the President may 
have been advised that, however much he might want to, he lacks the power 
to defund localities. Notably, in that event, neither the Attorney General 
nor the DHS Secretary could legitimately rely on the order to take away 
federal grants.237 As Judge Fernandez put it, “whatever the President, or 
others, might wish for in order to achieve what they deem to be a more 
 
231 Id. at 1249-50. 
232 Id. at 1249. 
233 Supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
234 Sanctuary City Order, supra note 220, § 9(a), at 8801. 
235 See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
236 Although one can debate the relevant context for purposes of textual analysis, this Article 
assumes that context includes other presidential directives (at least those issued by the same 
administration). See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
237 The Attorney General has sought to rely on other sources of legal authority to defund 
sanctuary cities. But those efforts have so far met with mixed results. Compare City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283-87, 293 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding the Attorney General lacked statutory 
authority); Philadelphia v. Attorney General, 916 F.3d 276, 279, 293 (3d Cir. 2019) (same), with State 
v. Department of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 90, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that the Attorney 
General had statutory authority to deny certain federal funds to localities that did not comply with 
“three immigration-related conditions” and finding no Tenth Amendment violation). 
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perfect polity,” the Executive Order seems to “recognize[] their limits in 
achieving that.”238 
C. The Institutional Setting of Presidential Directives 
This Article has emphasized that any theory of interpreting presidential 
directives must focus on both Article II and the institutional setting of the 
presidency. A few features of that institutional setting buttress this Article’s 
case for textualism. Indeed, textualism may have more appeal in this context 
than it does in the statutory realm. 
1. The Relevance of Publicly-Available Statements 
As the sanctuary cities litigation illustrates, one question that courts face 
is determining whether to rely on extratextual evidence to inform the 
meaning of a presidential directive. I argue that the existence of the 
interagency consultation process casts considerable doubt on the utility of 
such evidence. 
Notably, extratextual evidence is often not even available. Indeed, 
presidential directives differ from statutes and regulations in part because 
there is typically no “executive history” or other administrative record.239 The 
OMB does keep a file on executive orders and proclamations but generally 
does not release those files until many years after a directive is issued (if at 
all).240 And OMB likely has no information about the agency review process 
for other directives. Accordingly, in most cases, a court will have no executive 
history, even if it presumed that such materials might shed light on the 
 
238 S.F., 897 F.3d at 1248 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 
239 “Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Although some jurists worried in the early-twentieth 
century about the public availability of legislative history, there is no question that lawyers today 
can access that material. See Nelson, supra note 75, at 367 (“[T]he most widely used kinds of 
legislative history are [just as] available to the [public as] the statutory texts they purport to 
explain.”). 
240 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 147-48 (noting that as of his 2012 article, “some executive 
order files [were] available up to late 1987”). Some materials may be accessible via a Freedom of 
Information Act request, but such proceedings can be lengthy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018) (stating 
that FOIA applies to the Executive Office of the President, which encompasses the OMB); see also 
David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1097, 1135, 1140 (2017) (noting complaints by journalists that FOIA is “too sluggish, too difficult to 
navigate, and too limited in its substantive scope to be of much use”) Even if the materials were 
available, much of the file would be of limited value, given that the President does not see the bulk 
of the agency comments. The most valuable document would be the memo that the President 
receives along with the text, providing an overview of the interagency debate. It is unclear whether 
that document is typically in the OMB file. See Section II.B (describing the documents that go to 
the President). 
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interpretive inquiry. Although this Article does not rely heavily on the point, 
the lack of executive history does provide a functional reason for courts to 
adopt a textualist approach to presidential directives. 
The more important question, in my view, is what courts should do with 
the extratextual material that is available. After all, as the sanctuary cities 
litigation illustrates, even if there is no “executive history,” a court may be 
able to look at public statements by the White House press secretary or even 
comments by the President himself. 
I argue that the very existence of the interagency consultation process 
casts doubt on the utility of such “outside comments” to discern the 
meaning of a directive.241 The President may have an incentive to take a 
strong stand in the public sphere, as when President Trump threatened to 
“use defunding as a ‘weapon’” against sanctuary cities.242 Yet behind closed 
doors, the discussions may look very different—as officials raise concerns 
about the legality or wisdom of a proposed action. Ultimately, the President 
may opt to sign a compromise or even toothless directive—one that does 
not reflect his preferred substantive policy. Courts give effect to that 
presidential decision by adhering to the text of the directive that the 
President has designated as law. 
2. Updating Directives 
Statutory textualists “often respond to accusations that their 
interpretations lead to unwise or unjust results by insisting that ‘if Congress 
doesn’t like it, Congress can fix it.’”243 But such arguments seem insensitive 
to the very bicameralism and presentment process that textualists themselves 
emphasize. Because of the veto gates of the statutory process, it may be very 
challenging to amend a law in response to a judicial decision.244 
By contrast, presidential directives appear to be easier to revise.245 
Notably, two months after President Wilson granted the “blanket pardon” at 
 
241 To be clear, this Article focuses on the meaning, not the validity, of presidential directives. 
It is a separate question whether public statements by the President are relevant to an analysis of 
constitutionally impermissible motive. See supra note 178. 
242 Supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
243 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
58 (2d ed. 2013). 
244 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 467, 504-05 (2014) (doubting on this basis textualists’ “contention that legislatures 
generally can cure misinterpretations by courts”). 
245 Political scientist Sharece Thrower has shown that around half of the executive orders 
issued between 1937 and 2013 have been modified in some way. See Sharece Thrower, To Revoke or 
Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 642, 643-44 
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issue in De Kay v. United States, he realized that he might have gone a bit 
overboard and issued a clarifying proclamation.246 The new directive stated 
that the pardon applied only to individuals whose sentences had been 
“illegally suspended”—that is, those affected by the Killits decision.247 
Likewise, President Clinton closed the (apparent) loophole in Ehsan by 
broadening the ban on “reexportations.”248 President Trump has revised his 
travel ban twice.249 
That is not to say that it is always easy to revise a presidential directive. 
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush utterly failed in their attempts to 
revoke Lyndon Johnson’s Executive Order 11,246, which barred 
discrimination and required affirmative action by government contractors.250 
As discussed, Presidents assume that revisions are subject to the same 
interagency consultation process as initial orders; and sometimes that process 
leads a President to issue no directive at all. Yet the complexity of the process 
still pales in comparison to the veto gates of the bicameralism and 
presentment process of Article I.251 Accordingly, to the extent a President 
concludes that a court has erred in its understanding of a given directive, the 
President can more readily respond.252 In short, some of the concerns with 
textualism in the statutory context seem to be less pressing here. 
 
(2017) (“Of the 6,158 executive orders issued between 1937 and 2013, 18% are amended, 8% are 
superseded, and 25% are revoked.”). 
246 Defining Pardon and Amnesty Proclamation Dated June 14, 1917 (Aug. 21, 1917), in 17 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8318-19 (New York, Bureau 
of National Literature, 1921). 
247 See id. (stating that the pardon should apply “to no other[]” defendants); see also supra 
Section I.B (discussing De Kay). It is unclear whether Wilson acted in response to the De Kay case. 
248 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether the Clinton Administration 
was prompted by the Ehsan case. 
249 See Travel Ban Version Two, supra note 24; Travel Ban Version Three, supra note 25. 
250 See subsection II.B.1.b. 
251 Cf. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 
GEO. L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992) (noting the oversized role of congressional players who “control the 
various veto gates”). 
252 Notably, I have not found empirical work specifically addressing presidential overrides of 
judicial decisions. Accordingly, I have no direct comparison to the literature on congressional 
overrides. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2014) 
(finding that the 1990s was “the golden age of overrides,” and “overrides declined . . . dramatically” 
after 1998). Nevertheless, given the empirical work suggesting that Presidents often modify 
directives (with or without a court decision), it seems quite plausible that Presidents would have an 
easier time responding to judicial decisions. See supra note 245 (discussing recent political science 
literature on presidential revocations of executive orders). 
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IV. A SELF-IMPOSED CONSTRAINT ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
The Opinions Clause of Article II empowers the President to seek out 
advice from his subordinates—to invite them to help him ensure the faithful 
execution of the laws. Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have exercised that 
power to create a robust interagency consultation process for presidential 
directives. Agency officials often spend weeks or months debating the legal 
and policy details of the text. And at the end of this process, the President 
may well opt for compromise. The federal judiciary, I argue, can best give 
effect to the structure the President has created under Article II—with its 
potential for compromise and less-than-effective policy—by adhering to the 
text of a directive. 
But this argument also has broader implications. Through the interagency 
consultation process, Presidents have opted to place a constraint on their own 
power. This Part first explores why Presidents may have crafted such a check 
and then suggests how the analysis here connects to theories of the 
constitutional separation of powers. 
A. Structural and Political Incentives 
It may seem surprising that Presidents would, in effect, tie their own 
hands through the process for issuing directives. But Presidents have 
various structural and political incentives to rely on their subordinates. 
First, as a practical matter, Presidents do not have time to draft (perhaps 
any) directive. So they must rely on subordinates to do the writing. Second, 
Presidents are generalists; they do not have expertise in the myriad areas in 
which Presidents issue directives—ranging from proclaiming national 
monuments,253 to overseeing government procurement contracts,254 to 
barring financial transactions involving threatening foreign powers.255 
Presidents thus rely on subordinates (often, from multiple agencies) who 
have expertise in a given area.256 
 
253 See Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) 
(2018)) (providing that the President may declare historic landmarks on federal land). 
254 See Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 
377 (codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121 (2018)) (together, providing that “[t]he President may prescribe 
policies and directives” to ensure “an economical and efficient” procurement system). 
255 See International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, 
§§ 202, 203, 91 Stat. 1626, 1626-27 (Dec. 28, 1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702) (providing 
that the President may bar transactions with foreign countries that present “an unusual and 
extraordinary threat”). 
256 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (stating that, with respect to both executive orders and 
other directives, agencies “with expertise [are] consulted”). 
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The Opinions Clause seems specifically designed to provide the President 
with such expert advice. The Clause empowers the President to demand from 
his “principal Officer[s]” a written opinion “upon any Subject relating to the 
Duties of their respective Offices”—that is, matters on which those officers 
are more likely to have expertise.257 Moreover, the consultation among 
agencies increases the level and amount of expertise—and may lead to better 
policy (although that is by no means guaranteed).258 As Neal Katyal has 
suggested, “[w]hen the State and Defense Departments have to convince each 
other of why their view is right . . . better decision-making” may result.259 
Third, the President may conclude that listening to his subordinates—and 
respecting their wishes—will increase their willingness to implement 
presidential policies. This point relates to a structural reality of the presidency: 
“[T]he President alone and unaided [cannot] execute the laws. He must execute 
them by the assistance of subordinates.”260 Although many theories of Article 
II rest on the assumption that subordinates always do what the President says, 
some political scientists have questioned that assumption.261 
That research is still ongoing. For present purposes, it is enough that 
the President himself may worry about implementation.262 In 2007, Clinton 
complained that he was “frustrated” during his presidency because “I’d issue 
all these executive orders” and could “never be 100 percent sure that they 
 
257 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. As discussed, I assume that the President has discretion to 
determine which “Subject[s]” relate to an official’s duties. See supra note 94. 
258 Interagency consultation does not ensure good decisions. Although one can debate what 
qualifies as a “good” decision, I suspect virtually everyone today would agree that Franklin 
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 falls outside that category. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 
1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizing the exclusion of “any person” from designated “military 
areas”). The order led to the internment of over 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, including 
70,000 U.S. citizens. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE 
INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 108-09 (2001). As Amanda Tyler recounts, when the 
Roosevelt Administration debated the draft order, Attorney General Francis Biddle repeatedly 
asserted that the federal government could not detain citizens, without a formal suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus. See AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME 224-27 (2017). But 
the Attorney General lost that interagency battle and ultimately “capitulated.” Id. at 227; see also 
supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text (describing how, from the 1930s on, executive orders were 
reviewed by the Attorney General for “form and legality”). 
259 Katyal, supra note 17, at 2317. 
260 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); see also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
498, 513 (1839) (“The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments . . . .”). 
261 See Joshua B. Kennedy, “‘Do This! Do That!’ and Nothing Will Happen”: Executive Orders and 
Bureaucratic Responsiveness, 43 AM. POL. RES. 59, 61 (2015) (finding that agencies “sometimes” obey 
executive orders and that “the conditions under which agencies will forego responding to a 
presidential directive are multi-faceted”); see also Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 157 (“If agencies are 
told, ‘do this,’ do they ‘do that’? . . . . We don’t know, as yet.”). 
262 Cf. William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
417, 433-36 (2005) (“All presidents . . . struggle to ensure that those who work below them will 
faithfully follow orders.”). 
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were implemented.”263 As Rudalevidge suggests, a President may conclude 
that “[a]n agency that writes the orders . . . is surely more likely to carry 
them out.”264 
Finally, the President may rely on the interagency consultation process to 
avoid embarrassing (and perhaps politically costly) mistakes. Several of the 
officials I interviewed volunteered this point as the single most important 
reason for a President to engage in consultation. As one official put it, the 
process not only constrains but also “protects the President.”265 
B. A Different Type of Check 
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Presidents have invited subordinate 
officials to play a key role in crafting presidential directives. And at the end 
of this interagency consultation process, Presidents have issued directives that 
do not fully advance the President’s preferred policy. Instead, the President 
often opts to split the difference among agencies or substantially “soften” a 
directive. In this way, the interagency consultation process serves as a 
constraint on presidential power. 
The process appears to be an example of what Katyal has dubbed the 
“internal separation of powers.”266 Notably, Katyal has emphasized the role of 
career civil servants. As he explains, the complex bureaucracy—replete with 
government officials who serve from administration to administration—can 
push back on “presidential adventurism.”267 
The analysis here suggests a different kind of internal check. Presidents 
themselves have invited the constraint—and not primarily from career civil 
 
263 Andrew Rudalevige, The Administrative Presidency and Bureaucratic Control: Implementing a 
Research Agenda, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 10, 18 (2009) (quoting Clinton’s statement). 
264 Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 157. A few officials I interviewed found this view plausible. 
See Bies Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that Presidents consult with agencies in part because “you 
need ‘buy in’” from officials who will implement the directive); see also Egan Interview, supra note 9 
(stating that agency officials would not likely “flout” a presidential directive but might resist it by 
stating the “document is ‘so flawed’ that they can’t adhere in current form”). 
265 Bies Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the process “protects the President as much as 
it does” any agency); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (stating that “if process weren’t followed, you can 
have problems” and that can lead to “embarrassment” for the President). 
266 See Katyal, supra note 17, at 2318 (“outlin[ing] a set of mechanisms that create checks and 
balances within the executive branch”). 
267 See id. at 2317-18 (“Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy creates 
a civil service not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term 
institutional worldview.”). Along similar lines, Jon Michaels has recently emphasized that the federal 
bureaucracy may serve as a check on political appointees. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving 
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 543-47 (2015) (detailing how the civil service has 
“institutional, cultural, and legal incentives to insist that agency leaders follow the law . . . and 
refrain from partisan excesses”). 
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servants but rather from political appointees.268 The Opinions Clause, of 
course, is focused on those “principal Officer[s],”269 and those officials seem 
to have the most influence over the crafting of presidential directives. When 
the President weighs in during the agency review process, he does so at the 
request of a Cabinet member or other top official.270 That should perhaps not 
be surprising; a lower-level official is far less likely to have the President’s ear. 
And although many officials may be invited to comment on a directive, the 
President hears primarily about the “high-level” views of, for example, 
Cabinet members.271 As I have suggested, the President may be willing to 
listen to these officials, in part because he selected these “principal Officer[s]” 
for their positions.272 So when these officials disagree with one another, they 
can at times push the President toward compromise. 
Scholars have become increasingly interested in such subconstitutional 
constraints on presidential power. That is in part because many 
commentators have lost confidence in Congress’s capacity to serve as a 
reliable “check,” at least when the House, Senate, and President are 
controlled by the same political party.273 So scholars have suggested 
alternative mechanisms for providing the “checks and balances” envisioned 
by the Madisonian scheme of separated powers. For example, Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule have argued that politics and public opinion place 
 
268 Notably, both Katyal and Jon Michaels are skeptical about the capacity of political 
appointees to constrain presidential power. See Michaels, supra note 267, at 538-40 (“[T]here is 
reason to expect agency leaders to promote their boss’s initiatives . . . .” rather than enforce statutory 
directives); see also Katyal, supra note 17, at 2332-33 (expressing concern about the rising “number of 
political actors in agencies” who serve for short periods and may lack the competence of career 
bureaucrats). The analysis here suggests that political appointees can constrain presidential power 
when the President invites the constraint. 
269 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
270 See supra subsections II.B.1–2. 
271 See supra subsections II.B.1–2. 
272 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States”); see also supra 
Section II.A. 
273 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2329 (2006) (“[W]hen government is unified . . . we should expect interbranch 
competition to dissipate.”); accord Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1809–10 n.222 (2007); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 479 (2008). Some scholarship 
has questioned the premises of the “separation of parties” critique. See JOSH CHAFETZ, 
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28-35 (2017) (urging that each house of Congress does at times 
protect its institutional interests, and also making the deeper point that cooperation during periods 
of unified government may be “a feature of the American governing system, not a bug,” if it reflects 
the wishes of the public); David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (“[T]he behavior of federal officials cannot always be explained simply 
by partisan or ideological motives.”). 
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important limits on what the President can do.274 Jack Goldsmith and 
Gillian Metzger have argued that the President is constrained by a variety 
of forces, including the other branches, the bureaucracy, and external groups 
like the press, lawyers, and nonprofit organizations.275 
This Article adds a “self-imposed” check to the mix. Through the 
interagency consultation process, Presidents have placed a constraint on their 
own unilateral action. Accordingly, presidential directives turn out to be less 
unilateral than one might have anticipated—at least under the system 
Presidents have developed since the 1930s. 
C. The Contingency of the Interpretive Method 
This final point leads me to an important observation, which further 
underscores the distinction between statutory and presidential textualism. 
Many statutory textualists argue that their method derives from the 
bicameralism and presentment process of Article I.276 Under that view, 
statutory textualism is baked into the constitutional scheme. 
The case for textualism in the context of presidential directives is 
different. Article II does not, standing alone, call for a textualist approach. 
Instead, the case for textualism depends on the manner in which the President 
has exercised his Article II power. The Opinions Clause invites the President 
to seek out advice from his subordinates. Pursuant to that authority, 
Presidents have created a complex scheme for issuing directives, relying on 
agency officials to draft, redraft, and bargain over the content of directives. 
At the end of this process, the President often opts for compromise among 
competing agency views. Courts, I argue, best give effect to that presidential 
decision by hewing closely to the text. 
Article II thus invites, but does not require, the President to create this 
interagency consultation scheme.277 Nor does Article II demand that the 
President opt for compromise. The existing scheme for crafting presidential 
directives, like many other aspects of administrative governance, depends on 
 
274 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 4-5, 12-13 
(2010) (stating that these constraints include elections, public approval ratings, and presidential 
concerns about long-term legacy). 
275 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT xi-xii, 209 (2012) (arguing that these 
forces not only constrain the President but have also legitimated the growth in presidential power); 
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State 
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77-85 (2017) (noting that these constraints ensure “good 
government” and serve “essential constitutional function[s]”). 
276 See supra Section I.C. 
277 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing” 
of officials (emphasis added)); supra Section II.A. 
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a mix of political incentives, norms, and conventions, rather than legal 
requirements.278 Accordingly, in contrast to prominent theories of statutory 
interpretation, this Article’s case for textualism is contingent. 
This point underscores the extent to which interpretive theory turns on 
both constitutional law and institutional setting. A significant change in 
institutional design may call for a different interpretive approach.279 For now, 
however, courts should recognize that Presidents have for a mix of reasons 
opted to tie their own hands. Courts show respect for that presidentially 
created scheme—with its potential for compromise and less-than-effective 
policy—by adhering to the text. 
CONCLUSION 
Theories of interpretation depend on both constitutional law and 
institutional setting. For statutes, the focus is properly on Article I and the 
other rules and procedures governing Congress. By contrast, for presidential 
directives, the emphasis must be on Article II and the institutional 
mechanisms of the presidency. This Article contends that both the 
constitutional structure and that institutional setting point toward textualism. 
But whether or not one accepts that conclusion, the theoretical point holds. 
Any theory of interpreting presidential directives should begin with Article 
II. Contrary to the assumption of federal courts for over a century, 
presidential directives should not be treated just like statutes. 
 
 
278 See supra Section IV.A (explaining why the President consults with officials); cf. Daphna 
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2221-30 (2018) (describing a 
“deliberative-presidency norm” that “requires a considered, fact-informed judgment in certain 
decisional domains”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1166-67 (2013) (emphasizing “the role of conventions in creating and protecting agency independence”). 
279 A full exploration of this contingency issue is beyond the scope of this Article. As discussed, 
there is good reason to assume that Presidents will—for a mix of practical and political reasons—
continue to rely on the interagency consultation process. See supra Section IV.A. If nothing else, it 
can be politically costly for a President not to consult with multiple administrative officials about a 
directive. Accordingly, this Article offers an interpretive theory that builds on the existing 
institutional structure. But I flag this contingency issue for a few reasons. First, I want to stress an 
important distinction between statutory textualism and presidential textualism. Second, I wish to 
call attention to an issue that seems to be worth further examination. Scholars may wish to consider, 
for example, whether and the extent to which other interpretive theories are contingent on certain 
institutional arrangements. 
